

In Canada official and public opinion strongly supported the measures taken by the United Nations to meet the crisis.¹ Government approval was recorded in the House of Commons on June 28 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs who stated that the decisions taken by the Security Council represented "collective action through the United Nations for peace". On June 30, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, told the House that "if a Canadian contribution... under a United Nations Commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace... then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution". This support soon assumed concrete form.² On July 12, Canada made available three destroyers; on July 21 an air transport squadron; and on August 11, in co-operation with the Canadian Pacific Airlines, passenger transport facilities between Vancouver and Tokyo. On August 7, the Government authorized recruitment of a Canadian Army Special Force, which, subject to Parliamentary approval, would be available for service in Korea. To this end the Canadian Forces Act was passed by Parliament and became law on September 9. An advance unit was despatched in October, and by December 19 a battalion had arrived in Korea to complete its advance training.

Despite the ready response of member nations, and particularly of the United States, to the North Korean aggression, and while the Unified Command was building up its strength for the counter-attack, the superior forces of the North Koreans compelled a steady retreat throughout July and August to a beach-head around Pusan. Meanwhile, on August 1, the Soviet Representative returned to the Security Council to take his turn as President and, as expected, to block any further constructive action on Korea. In anticipation of the revival of the veto, the Council passed a last resolution on this question on July 31, dealing with the problem of civilian relief.³

By mid-September the first phase of the Korean crisis had ended. The Security Council was inhibited from further action by the return of the U.S.S.R., which purported to view recent events in the inverted perspective of an unsuccessful attack by the Republic of Korea, backed by the United States and condoned by the illegal actions of an improperly constituted organ of the United Nations. Moreover, United Nations forces had gone over to the offensive and after the Inchon landing on September 15, were approaching the 38th parallel. Additional and urgent United Nations decisions, involving the unification and rehabilitation of Korea and, more immediately, the scope of further military operation were clearly required. Discussion of the Korean question was, therefore, transferred to the General Assembly which had, in any case, an item on its agenda entitled "Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea" dealing with the problem of the independence and unification of that country.

¹See *Canada and the Korean Crisis*, September 1, 1950, and *Documents on the Korean Crisis*, January 24, 1951.

²While the bulk of military forces in the Korean operation were supplied by the United States, contributions in the form of naval, ground or air forces, or hospital units, were offered by the following countries and had been accepted by the Unified Command as of December 31, 1950: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom.

³See "Aid for Korea", pp. 56-58.