

deducted for the West India expedition, and 40,000 at Texel and Brest together, for whom there was not transport; leaving 150,000 who could have been embarked for the invasion.

**FRENCH NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES PREPARED TOWARDS THE INVASION OF ENGLAND, 1805.**

<i>Places.</i>		<i>Troops.</i>			
TEXEL—	{	French 18,000,	Marshal Marmont.		
	{	Dutch 12,000,			
		Dutch Ships of the Line 5.			
BREST—		French 25,000,	General Angereau.		
		French Ships of the Line 21, Admiral Gantheaume.			
ROCHEFORT—		French 4,000.			
		French Ships of the Line 6, Admirals Mississey and Lalleland.			
FERROL ....	}	Spanish 5,000	} French 5 ships		
CADIZ .....				}	} Spanish 10 "
CARTHAGENA					
		Admirals Gourdon, Grandallana and Gravina.			
TOULON—		French 9,000,	French Ships of the Line 11, Admirals Trevillo and Villeneuve.		
BOULOGNE	French,	Ambleteuse 23,727	Marsh. [Davoust.		
do	do	Boulogne 30,657	Marsh. [Sault.		
do	do	Etaples 20,527	Marsh. [Ney.		
do	do	Reserve 38,801	Gen. [Baraguay d'Hilliers.		
do		Staff and Non-combat.	9,233		
Total		122,915'			
Horses 14,254	{	Officers. . . . .	1,023		
	{	Troops . . . . .	6,065		
	{	Artillery. . . . .	7566		
Totals : 195,000 troops ; 78 ships of the line.					

**THE LAND PREPARATIONS IN ENGLAND.**

*Unready in 1804—as in 1583.*

If there were some points of resemblance between the preparations for the invasion of England in 1803 and those in 1588, there are more between the preparations for resisting it at those two epochs. The general organization of the forces of the country had been, indeed, much altered since the days of the Tudors: the permanent Royal Army had been increased, the old constitutional Militia had been put on a settled footing by Act of Parliament, and a new edition of it in the shape of Volunteers had been established; and the whole was placed much more under the central authority of the Government itself, the same mistaken parsimony and the same bewildering suus when the supreme moment arrived. There was, indeed, the same enthusiasm in the country; at the first sound of the trumpet of victory the English war-spirit broke forth, as it did in the days of Elizabeth; but the very centralizing of the authority, which ought to have led that enthusiasm, by its own supineness wasted it away. The counties were ready to act as over, but they had no longer that spring of local power to act: the men of Kent had no longer the responsibility of defending Kent. It was a better system, no doubt, to have a powerful central authority, but that authority having failed to do his duty, as in 1588, there was no independent local action to fill the gap as in 1588 days.

Now this is not merely a question of historical interest; we have a much more serious concern in it, for the same defects still exist and will lead to the same imminent danger in the next great war we are engaged in. We have gone on improving

the condition of the permanent Royal Army and elaborating a system on paper, and at the same time we have been accumulating more and more power in the central Government, and more and more sapping that local spirit which is after all the essence of English action. And this has resulted from the form of Parliamentary Government now existing in this country; not indeed directly because in all civil questions that come before Parliament, the importance of local government is always strongly insisted on, but the jealousy of Parliament has prevented any Government from ever trying to put the system of defence of the country on a broader, more permanent, and more local, and therefore more national basis, although a proper system of that kind would on the whole tend to deprive the central Government of some of the military power they have now got possession of.

The defensive measures began in England at the same time that the Revolutionary Government in France began to threaten them with invasion. Neither side appeared to be very much in earnest in the matter: the French apparently did not care to do more than make desultory descents upon Ireland and England, and the English felt so confident in the naval guard they kept on the narrow seas, that they did little on land but call out the Militia and arm the old existing coast batteries; and under the reactionary influence that brought about the peace of 1801, even this small expense was economized. The trained troops were disbanded, the guns and stores sold, and the ships paid off, which had been slowly accumulated during the eight years of war, and all in order that the Government of the day should gain popularity by reducing the estimates. Very heavily we are paying for that one year's popularity.

Very different was the feeling twelve months after, when the terrible Napoleon, who now directed the energies of France, and who struck down one enemy after the other on the continent, now turned the individual forces of his goupes and of his kingdom upon what was known to be his most ardent desire—the crushing of England by one overwhelming blow. The popular Government of peace was speedily dismissed to make way for the only man who was felt to be a match for the dreaded enemy, William Pitt. And in 1803 after a peace of Great Britain's own making and breaking, the country had to begin almost *de novo* in creating a fleet and an army and defences, with the foe looking in at the gate. That the country escaped being conquered was no merit of that popular Government, nor of the Parliament; it was due under God's Providence to national characteristics, which from time to time save England in spite of Governments.

*The Six War Departments.*

I cannot but congratulate His Royal Highness the present Commander-in-Chief. The record of all these struggles to get ready for the impending blow is contained in the correspondence of the various departments concerned. I have been allowed to look over some of the records left by his illustrious predecessor the Duke of York; and I cannot but congratulate His Royal Highness that he has but a Secretary of State to deal with, and that in peace, instead of the task of his royal uncle, who had six different independent departments of the Government to consult, in face of *la Poutance*. There was the Colonial Ministry, who guided the general operations of the war; the Secretary at War, who raised the forces; the Master General of the Ord-

nance, who provided the war stores and commanded the artillery and engineers; the Treasury, who provided the supplies; the Home Office, who controlled the reserve forces; and the Admiralty, who conducted the naval defence. The Commander-in-Chief and his General of districts might propose plans of defence; but any one of these political chiefs might upset the whole by putting in or leaving out his own little independent spoke. If a coast battery was to be altered, the proposition must be submitted through the General of the district to the Commander-in-Chief for his general approval, to the Master General for the guns; to the Secretary at War for the pay of the gunners; to the Treasury for their food; and to the Admiralty for the coast signal. That any defences were ready by 1805 is in itself a memorial of the energy of the British character which could overcome so cumbersome a machine of war.

The machine still exists. It has been put together in a new form, in one large case, and labelled WAR DEPARTMENT; and many people believe it to be an entirely new engine capable of being set in motion by one person. It does very well for show in peace time, but try to set it to work for any practical purpose, and it will be found that the old limbs are there still with the rust of ages on them, and particularly stiff in their connecting joints. And the most curious arrangement about this old machine for a practical people, as we profess to be, is that the man who has to work it, is specially selected on account of his total ignorance of its details, and in order to insure inexperience, he is changed at uncertain times. I am not thinking of the permanent officials in thus speaking of the War Department, I know well how hard they work for the nation; it is the Government and Parliament, who are to blame, who being responsible to the country for providing an efficient war machine, allow this over-worked old affair to go on.

*The Force Available.*

Throughout 1803 we find from the records that the Commander-in-Chief and his Generals were occupied in discussing a scheme of defence; about the middle of it, he expressed a confident hope that there would shortly be devised some means of impeding the enemy from advancing into the country; what then we may ask had the six independent departments been about, when after eight years of expectation of invasion, the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces, is still in an attitude of doubt as to the defence? In October of that year His Royal Highness made a general report to the Government on the scheme of defence he proposed: and this document is well worthy of the attention of all future defenders of the country; for though many of the conditions are quite altered, the local peculiarities and the general principles remain the same. He calculated on having in 1803, and he actually had in 1805, at his disposal for the defence of the United Kingdom, about the following force.

In Great Britain and the Channel Islands, 70,000 Regulars, 56,000 Militia, 33,000 Volunteers, 16,000 Sea Fencibles. In Ireland, 25,000 Regulars, 25,000 Militia, 10,000 Sea Fencibles. Total 326,000.

There were then in the East Indies and in the Colonies about 50,000 regulars and Colonial corps.

The Commander-in-Chief had, therefore, for the defence of Great Britain (as the troops in Ireland could not be removed under the circumstances) about 126,000 of what in the loose military ideas of that