

*Difficulties
in delivery
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proliferation*

at the U.S.S.R. (all of which have been excluded from SALT owing to American insistence that to do otherwise would be ludicrous). As for the cruise missile, the stance of both sides similarly indicates a disinclination to negotiate. Yes, it is cheap (though slower, and therefore more vulnerable), it is useful, and the U.S. leads in the development of long-range versions. But it is not going to change the strategic balance. It is at most going to allow for an even more redundant capacity for overkill. And it is not even going to remain a U.S. preserve for long. Soviet mastery of shorter-range versions, and continuing Soviet research, make a mockery of assertions to the contrary. The technology is not so revolutionary after all; rather, it represents a refinement of long-existing, dormant technological possibilities. The cruise missile may be crucial to fears of proliferation because it promises third powers a cheaper method of delivery (it is not the availability of nuclear technology that has deterred proliferation, it is the technologically and financially more daunting task of acquiring effective delivery means).

Superiority

If there is a Soviet threat to be guarded against, it emanates not from Soviet military superiority but from a superiority of Soviet will. The U.S. suffers from a lost sense of purpose and a perversion of self-professed ideals. Why is it that Moscow's aspirations on the world scene can be made to appear more consonant with those of the Founding Fathers than can Washington's? Any Vietnamese historian, if listened to, could have forecast that the only thing that could have induced Ho Chi-Minh to rely to the slightest degree on his long-time rival Mao was the degree of U.S. military hostility that was to be unleashed on the peculiar premise of his being a dangerous puppet of the Chinese. Similarly, anyone truly familiar with Angola and Africa, with Neto's friendship for the Portuguese anti-Soviet socialist leader Soares, and with the MPLA's favouring of the anti-white Fanon's teachings over those of Lenin, could have forecast that the only way of maximizing sympathy and support for Moscow would lie in (quasi-) alliance with the "No. 1 Enemy", the Republic of South Africa. Soviet success has been due in no small part to U.S. abnegation of its own principles; to argue otherwise is to put the cart before the horse.

The vacillations of *détente* have been owing to the vacillations of U.S. domestic

political perceptions, not to changing Soviet attitudes. Moscow has throughout been explicit in its view of *détente* as a limited, pragmatic accommodation to maintain mutual state interests. It has seen *détente* as an extension of "peaceful co-existence", a defusing of the threat of a war that would be mutually suicidal but still a conflict on the economic, technological and other levels. Moscow never used the term *détente*, preferring *razryad*, a term that allows for the possibility of sudden termination.

It was always clear to most people familiar with the Soviet scene that American hopes of changing Soviet domestic realities as a *quid pro quo* for Western technology credits were quite unrealistic. There is no doubt that Moscow has continued Western economic "inputs", viz. its continuing lend-lease repayments even in the face of the demise of the 1972 Trade Agreement. But the U.S.S.R. is not desperate for Western goods in spite of prognostications of doom for the Soviet economy every year since the 1972 Trade Agreement. The Soviet economy continues to advance at a respectable pace notwithstanding acknowledged bottlenecks, continuing inefficiencies, etc. Hence, the phenomenon of increased Jackson-Vanik pressure on Jewish emigration being accompanied by a steady decrease in actual emigration hence Moscow's refusal to countenance the 1974 Congressionally-imposed bill conditions. The U.S.S.R. would not afford such obvious humiliations. Its chosen image, bolstered by increased confidence, demands "equality".

One might argue a case for negotiating. One cannot argue a case for prejudiced treatment, inequality; such a policy can only be counterproductively futile. A relaxation of Soviet international (or emigration) policies might (or might not) result from a longer era of pragmatic change. It certainly — if unfortunately — will not result from the type of pressure envisaged by the 1974 Congress.

The hopes of 1972 were very unrealistic. The expectations of 1974 have represented an unnecessarily negative reaction to either or both of these realizations. There remain strong, persuasive arguments in favour of seriously pragmatically-considered Western technology and credit-barter arrangements with Moscow, arrangements of proportional mutual risk, proportional promise. Unemotional consideration of these arguments, and of possibly more potent counter-arguments, awaits the U.S. Administration of Jimmy Carter.