

fence of Formosa. Mr. Dulles had made it clear that this was not in itself a commitment to defend the coastal islands. Mr. Pearson thought that the Chinese Communists might have decided that an attack on Quemoy or Matsu or an attack on Formosa would be too dangerous, but he was unwilling to come to a categorical conclusion on this matter. Although the possibility of a Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy and Matsu still remained, there was reason to hope that the Peking authorities had decided that any advantage which they might gain from such an attack would not justify the risk involved. There was no evidence that a full-scale attack on either the off-shore islands or Formosa was imminent.

Mr. Pearson went on to say that the Canadian Government made a clear distinction between an attack on Quemoy and Matsu and an attack on Formosa. An attack on Formosa could conceivably be aggression if it were so determined by the United Nations, because the position of Formosa had not been finally decided in international law. The Canadian Government did not necessarily accept the Chinese Communists' position, or indeed the Chinese Nationalists' position, that Formosa was part of China. The Canadian Government did think, however, that if a decision were to be made, the wishes of the Formosans should be considered. Mr. Pearson then stated that if an attack on Formosa were considered by the United Nations to be an aggression, Canada as a member of the United Nations would be under an obligation to take appropriate part in any action which the United Nations might decide. If, however, the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu were attacked, the Canadian Government would have no obligation to intervene in any way because it considered these islands to be part of continental China. The Minister felt that the Canadian policy had been clearly laid down.

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### THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

In response to a request made by Mr. Patterson, M.P. for Fraser Valley, the Minister gave the Standing Committee an account of recent developments in Indochina and the work of the International Supervisory Commissions. Mr. Pearson reported that the work of the three Commissions in Indochina had not diminished in any substantial way since he had last referred to this matter in the Standing Committee, although a few of the military officers had been withdrawn. He went on to say that there were still about 160 Canadians serving on the three Commissions. The Minister said that these Canadian servicemen and officials had performed valuable and efficient services in Indochina, often amid difficulties and dangers.

#### Vietnam

Mr. Pearson pointed out that in Vietnam a new situation had arisen because of the imminent departure of the French forces. The termination of French authority in Vietnam had raised the problem of the position of the successor government of South Vietnam with relation to the Armistice Agreement which had been signed at Geneva in 1954, and of the transfer of responsibilities which France had undertaken. Mr. Pearson pointed out that the Government of South Vietnam had not signed the Agreement and that, therefore, it did not accept responsibility for its implementation. The withdrawal of French forces also raised the question of the legal position of the Commis-