which was derived from the draft resolution sponsored by the U.S.A. and the U.K.

neu

an

ves req

> orc sai

in

in

be

m

th

a

a

uı

n

ol

d

C

These together constitute a clear directive from the United Nations as towhat it expects the nuclear powers to achieve in this resumed session of the 18-Nation Committee.

Verification Issue

As all committee members are aware, the "remaining difference" between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the U.K. and the U.S.A. on the other side relates to verifying that an agreement to cease underground nuclear tests is being observed by all parties. This might be still more narrowed by saying the question is precisely to what extent on-site inspection is required for ensuring compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests. Operative Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1762 (A) says that, if a complete agreement covering all four environments is not reached by the 1st of January (and this of course is the best solution), there should be an agreement to prohibit all tests in the three environments in which verifying the observance of obligations does not involve the question of on-site inspection. The paragraph goes on to say that this should be accompanied by an interim arrangement to stop underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum, and that the interim arrangement should include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismin events by an international scientific commission.

The question of a commission for verifying the observance of obligation under a test-ban treaty has been discussed between the nuclear powers for the past four years and a large measure of agreement was reached by mid-1961. The Canadian delegation can see no reason why, given that "spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently, bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind" (operative Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1762 (A)), the nuclear powers should not be able to decide on the framework of such a commission, at least on an interim basis, in a very few meetings.

Swedish Proposal

Mr. Edberg (Sweden) suggested that it should be possible to establish the commission without awaiting the final drafting and entry into force of a comprehensive agreement. This is a suggestion which the delegation of Sweden has made before, which was endorsed by other non-aligned members of the Committee. Canada supported this idea, and still supports it. Examining the fourth paragraph of the eight-nation memorandum of April 16, 1962, we find that the suggestion for "an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly-qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff" is unspecific and was doubtless intended to be so. Mr. Edberg made some further practical and useful suggestions as to how the commission should be constituted and what its function should be. The Canadian delegation feels that the essential point in setting up such a commission is that it should be so constituted that