

64.

DEA/50271-M-40

*Le conseiller du Gouvernement canadien en matière du désarmement  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Advisor to Government of Canada on Disarmament  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 55

Geneva, February 26, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tel N-26 Feb 25.

Repeat for Information: Washington, London, NATO Paris, Paris, Permis New York,  
Bonn, Rome (Priority), CCOS (JS/DSS) Ottawa (Priority) from Ottawa.

By Bag Moscow from London.

## DISARMAMENT: CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

Today I have seen Foster and Godber and have put to them your views on necessity for early conclusion of a nuclear test ban. Godber thought that the situation was not repeat not unfavourable but that we must give Russians a little time to reconsider their position i.e. to move from their present insistence that two to three on-site inspections and three automatic seismic stations is as far as they will go. He said the Soviet decision-making apparatus does not repeat not usually work very rapidly. Foster stressed the difficult political situation in USA. His conversations last week with various senators and congressmen in key positions were not repeat not all encouraging. The climate could hardly be worse for additional "concessions" by USA in view of confused and disturbed feelings about the Cuban situation and difficulties over defence matters with European NATO allies. Nevertheless the President is still determined to press for a nuclear test ban and hopes that a treaty could be got through the Senate provided essential requirements for verification can be made. Foster hoped that given a little time the process of educating opinion in this matter in the Congress and Senate will be effective. If Kuznetsov does not repeat not return soon, Foster may decide he could work more effectively at this in Washington and will leave Stelle to lead the delegation here.

2. I suggested to both Godber and Foster that the West should make a clear statement in plenary of their requirements as to composition of inspecting teams, procedure for deciding on events to be inspected, area to be inspected, and other essential features of an agreement aside from actual number of on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations. This would enable Conference and especially neutrals to judge reasonableness of these requirements. Foster said he intended to do this, probably Friday.

3. I also said that it would be important to give as clear evidence as possible refuting Soviet claim that all repeat all underground nuclear tests had been and could be identified. Foster agreed this would be useful and USA delegation will see whether such a statement can be prepared.

4. I also saw today Lall, Hassan, Imru (Ethiopia), and Obi (Nigeria), and talked over possibilities for moving negotiations forward. Non-aligned had had a meeting this morning but had not repeat not decided on any concerted action. On the whole they were encouraged by the "numbers" now having reached the position of three to seven and hoped that with a little time, and continued pressure, agreement would be reached. They agreed that statements from the West on the lines I suggested to Foster would be helpful.

[E.L.M.] BURNS