

report (Document 85). Pearson asked the Department of External Affairs to examine in general Canada's relations with the United States. Although this study was never completed, and its background papers proved too long and numerous for publication here, it led to a noteworthy conclusion. In an oft-cited speech delivered to a joint meeting of the Empire and Canadian Clubs in Toronto on 10 April 1951, Pearson acknowledged that "the days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbour are, I think, over."³

This was particularly true of defence relations between the two countries. Even as these ties grew closer and more extensive during 1951, managing them became increasingly difficult. Canadian airspace was gradually incorporated during the year into an informal, but very real, program for the joint defence of North America. In early January, Cabinet approved plans to extend dramatically the radar system on which the defence of North America was eventually erected (Documents 651 to 675). Subsequently, the two countries agreed to allow interceptor flights to disregard national borders when pursuing airborne intruders (Document 753) and to reinforce automatically each other's air force in the event of hostilities (Document 754). The Department of External Affairs and the Chiefs of Staff Committee began slowly to wrestle with the implications of appointing a Canadian officer to assist the American commander responsible for defending the eastern portions of North America, where the process of integration was most advanced (Documents 747 to 751). These complicated issues of command and control ushered in a new era in bilateral defence relations, culminating in the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command in 1957.

The United States, however, wanted more than just Canada's cooperation in the defence of North America; it also wanted secure access to bases and facilities in the Canadian north. The growing American military presence in Canada was an issue that had worried Liberal governments intermittently since the middle of the Second World War. In 1951, an American request for a long-term lease at Torbay, Newfoundland again placed the question before Cabinet. J.W. Pickersgill, the Prime Minister's special assistant, and Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence and an increasingly important influence on foreign policy, insisted that Canada no longer grant long-term leases to the United States (documents 714 to 746). It remained unclear at the end of the year how the two countries would deal with the continuing American requirement for bases in Canada.

Finding ways to exert Canada's sovereign rights in other contexts was even more difficult. The American request for a "canopy agreement" that would allow the United States to import and store nuclear weapons at Goose Bay continued to raise disturbing questions about Canada's role and responsibilities in American nuclear strategy and involved the two countries in a series of lengthy discussions (Documents 682 to 713). For a while, they experimented with an ad hoc arrangement under which the United States kept Canada abreast of those international developments that might eventually prompt it to employ nuclear weapons. In exchange, the Canadian government promised to meet any American request for

³ Lester B. Pearson "Canadian Foreign Policy in a Two-Power World," *Statements and Speeches* 51/14.