are fighting beside the other freedom-loving democracies. We have a definite part to play in this struggle. We know that we cannot win without the proper equipment; man-power alone will not do.

Churchill has said, "Give us the tools and we will finish the job." Our own Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen are now saying to us, "Give us the tools and we will help to finish the job." Our first task, therefore, is to turn out armaments of all kinds. Those armaments will to a large extent, for the time being, be sent to our gallant allies the great Russian people, who by their devotion and courage have taken a tremendous toll of the nazi hordes. More and more ships must be built, not only for our own defence, but also because our responsibility in the north Atlantic is to-day greater than ever before. It is obvious that unless the Atlantic passage is kept open, Canada will not be in a position to bring her armies and air force to grips with the enemy.

I cannot stress too strongly the necessity of producing as many aircraft as possible, and training men to operate those aeroplanes. No battle in this war has yet been won without air superiority. Three factors contributed most to the successful evacuation from Dunkirk: The English channel was calm; the British people who manned the small ships, and the sailors and soldiers, showed undaunted courage; but had it not been for our temporary air superiority, all this would have been in vain. The allied powers are depending to a large extent upon Canada to bring about, through the commonwealth air training plan, permanent air superiority.

Britain, likewise, as I have already said, has cast a great responsibility on Canada to supply food not only for the forces but for all the millions of brave people on that island fortress.

In order to carry out our gigantic task, the total wealth of our country, that is everything we have—our wealth, our natural resources, our man-power and woman-power-must be mobilized as rapidly as can be accomplished in an orderly fashion. We are already regulating industry, and are telling manufacturers what they may or may not make. We must now go one step further and organize our human resources so that each one, in so far as it is possible, will be placed where he or she can serve best. Those men who can contribute best to the defence of Canada in the factories must be kept in those factories. In many instances it will be found that women can replace men and that both men and women doing non-essential work can be transferred to industries working on essential war contracts. Our farms must be worked to provide food for our people, our armed forces and our allies; and man-power and woman-power must be provided to produce these foodstuffs. All this will be controlled through complete mobilization.

In my earlier remarks I stated that most of our armaments must in large part, for the time being, go to equip our gallant allies. When, however, we are in full production we should have a surplus with which to equip our armies in Canada. Some have suggested that we immediately call up large numbers of men for our army. By large numbers I mean tens or twenties or hundreds of thousands, as has been suggested. That, in my opinion, would be fatal to our war effort. It would necessarily take men from war-equipment manufacturing plants and, if the men are to be trained, it would take equipment in which the allies now are so woefully weak. Manpower for our army is not now our most pressing need. It must be remembered that if no battle has been won without air superiority, no battle has been lost from a lack of men, but rather from a shortage of equipment. Canada's place to-day in the allied plan for victory is primarily the providing of mechanized equipment, ships properly manned, aeroplanes with trained crews and large quantities of food. Some may take exception to that statement and say that we now have the equipment; and, as the British Prime Minister has stated, the crisis of man-power and woman-power is at hand, and will dominate the year 1942. By that statement he did not mean that Britain would recruit larger armies but that more men and women will be needed for replacements and to turn out armaments. Here are his words:

The crisis of equipment is largely over and an ever-broadening flow is now assured. The crisis of man-power and woman-power is at hand and will dominate the year 1942. This crisis comes upon us for the following reasons: The great supply plants have largely been constructed; they are finished; they must be staffed, and they must be fully staffed. We must maintain the powerful mobile army we have created with so much pains both for home defence and foreign expedition. We must maintain our armies in the east and be prepared for a continuance and an extension of heavy fighting there. We must provide for the expansion of the air force in 1942 and the far greater expansion which it will take in 1943. We must face a continuous growth of the navy to man the great numbers of warships of all kinds coming steadily into service. We must provide modern equipment for the large armies which are being raised and trained in India.

Apart from our own needs, we must keep our engagements to send a substantial supply of tanks, aeroplanes and other war weapons or war commodities to Russia in order to help