

collecting data that are most relevant to the assessment of compliance with an agreement in question, reliable, and accurate.

ENGAGING CHINA IN COOPERATIVE SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING BEIJING'S PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES

China's approaches to cooperative security and confidence building to a large extent reflect its changing threat perceptions.¹⁷ China's security policy in the post-Cold War era focuses on three issues: modernization, unification and territorial integrity, and great-power relations. That economic development is in command derives from the recognition that international competition is shifting from military confrontation to one that tests a country's overall economic, scientific and technological capabilities. Security is no longer affected by the military power of other countries alone; it is contingent on a host of factors. The building of the country's comprehensive national strength (*zonghe guoli*) is the only way to ensure China's long-term security. The emphasis on national reunification and sovereignty both reflects an eagerness to eradicate the legacy and remains of "the hundred years' humiliation" and demonstrates the continued sensitivity to perceived and real encroachment on China's territorial integrity. Anti-hegemonism is as much directed towards the US as it is to serve as a warning to Japan, which is increasingly being viewed as harboring political and military ambitions, hence constituting a long-term potential threat to China's security. While the geo-strategic reality dictates that Russia will remain a long-term competitor, for the time being, China is more confident the security threats Russia now poses is minimum. CBMs in this sense give the Russians assurance as much as they institutionalize what China has gained from a decade of negotiations.

Chinese perspectives on cooperative security have evolved over the last decade. Beijing has gradually begun to accept some of the key elements of cooperative security. These include unilateral disarmament measures such as the reduction over 1985-2000 of two million personnel from the People's Liberation Army (PLA); participation in multilateral cooperative security dialogues (e.g., the ASEAN Regional Forum and the South China Sea workshop); and CBM negotiations with India and Russia. However, at the same time, Beijing has been increasing its defense spending over the past decade; it has acquired a panoply of advanced Russian weaponry; and it has been modernizing its nuclear forces. These developments raise the question of learning and how it helps our understanding of changes in Chinese security policy over time.¹⁸ This refers to two concepts: learning in the sense that growing experience in various multilateral forums will make the Chinese both aware of the many benefits resultant from active participation and better multilateralist; and learning to the extent there is a fundamental change in their perceptions of the nature of threat and the appreciation that there are alternative, and hopefully more cost-effective ways

¹⁷ Jing-dong Yuan, "Threat Perception and Chinese Security Policy after the Cold War," *Pacific Focus* 13:1 (Spring 1998), pp.55-78.

¹⁸ See Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization* 48:2 (Spring 1994), pp.279-312.