

basis for further talks on the ban of CW. The future Convention on the ban of CW must encompass at least a part of the "other harmful chemicals". In that case, it seems logical to us that the definition of "precursors" must also encompass those chemical compounds which are also a component part of this group of chemical warfare agents.

Technological progress will in the future surely make it possible for a larger number of chemical compounds to be used as "precursors", which will, of course, present a danger of the emergence of new "binary mixtures" with different toxic effects. Theoretically, it is possible for chemical compounds of lesser toxicity to cause, in contact with the environment (water, air and other) the creation of poisonous materials of higher toxicity, which in itself renders the defining of "precursors" more complex.

In view of today's achievements in this area, for the purpose of definition and verification, "precursors" should be divided in relation to the already known division of chemical warfare agents (see: CD/112). We thus suggest:

- (a) Key "Precursors" for obtaining super-toxic lethal CWA,
- (b) Key "Precursors" for obtaining other lethal CWA, and
- (c) Key "Precursors" for obtaining other harmful CWA.

As concerns "precursor(s)" for obtaining super-toxic lethal CWA (nerve agents), in our opinion, the important binary precursors (i.e. alkylphosphonochloridates and -fluoridates) have a relatively limited use in times of peace. It therefore seems to us that it would not constitute any serious obstacle to treat these "precursors" as super-toxic lethal chemicals and to subject them to the same verification procedure. In our opinion a license system with surveillance should be established and the production and use outside this system prohibited.

It is certain that this division will also encompass a whole series of chemical compounds which serve a non-hostile purpose, especially if one bears in mind that even CWA from the group "other lethal" and "other harmful" serve dual purpose use. This is why dual purpose chemicals present a special problem. It is hardly possible to control the production or use of such common chemicals as hydrogen cyanide or phosgen. Therefore, their ban must be based on the purpose criterion. A large part of important chemical warfare agents, for instance mustards, could, however, be defined by means of chemical structure and be totally prohibited.