Chine se Communist Government to be present during the discussion of this question in the Council. It was also hoped that assurances regarding legitimate Chinese interests might ease the tension, and on November 10, a six-power resolution was presented to the Security Council calling on the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea, affirming at the same time that legitimate Chinese interests would be protected, and requesting UNCURK to assist in the settlement of any problems arising along the Chinese-Korean frontier. The Interim Committee on Korea had three days before unanimously resolved to give what assistance it could in this regard, and by the beginning of December the United Nations Commission had begun to consider the problems which it had been assigned.

On November 11, the Chinese Communist Government declined the Security Council's invitation to send representatives to discuss their intervention in Korea, and proposed instead a combined debate on Formosa and Korea. It had, however, announced that it would accept the Security Council's previous invitation of September 29 to the Chinese Communists to be represented during discussion of their own earlier complaint against United States "aggression" in Formosa. The delegation was to be headed by Mr. Wu Hsiu-chuan. It was hoped that the presence of representatives from Peking might at least open the way to private discussions of Korean issues and assist in clarifying the motives behind the Chinese intervention. The delegation arrived in New York on November 24, the day General MacArthur launched the offensive which he hoped would "end the war" and "restore peace and unity in Korea".

By the time Mr. Wu appeared at the Security Council on November 28, Chinese Communist and North Korean forces had already broken through the United Nations front, which had been pushed close to the Korean-Manchurian border. The United Nations had received General MacArthur's communique "that an entirely new war faced United Nations forces". It was therefore in serious terms that the United States delegate, Mr. Austin, addressed the Security Council. "It now appears doubtful", Mr. Austin said, "that war in Korea can be quickly concluded. It also appears clear beyond any doubt that what all the free world hoped was an intervention for limited purpose is, in fact, aggression - open and notorious. I use the word "aggression" here in this Council and before the world by direction of my government. The consequences of these facts must be faced squarely by the people of the world, and more particularly by this Council". Mr. Austin then asked the Chinese Communist delegate a score of questions concerning Peking's intervention in Korea.

In reply Mr. Wu pointed out that he had come to discuss the question of United States aggression against Formosa and not the special report of the Unified Command. After presenting the Chinese Communist case in uncompromising fashion and accusing the United States of aggression in Korea, he concluded with the proposal that the Security Council adopt measures calling for the withdrawal of United States forces from both Formosa and Korea.

On November 30, the six-power resolution calling on the Chinese Communists to withdraw their troops from Korea was voted on in the Security Council, and, as expected, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Nine votes were cast in favour, but India did not participate in the vote. The sponsors of the six-power resolution then submitted the question of Communist Chinese intervention to the General Assembly, which assigned it to its Political Committee. Another six-power resolution, almost identical with that vetoed in the Security Council, was at the same time placed on the agenda.