

Pearson and Brzoska maintain that using the Register as a predictor of war remains problematic since no one dimensional link exists between arms accumulations on the one hand, and the outbreak of war on the other. Wars have occurred in the absence of a military build-up or with only a small increase in armaments. To increase its applicability in this capacity, the Register must be amended. Pearson and Brzoska suggest including details on the political context of the receiving state, along with any pending arms deals or denials. Ideally, these amendments should be incorporated into an expanded Register which includes military holdings and procurement through national production. Without such modifications, the Register will remain an unreliable predictor of conflict.

434. Schear, James A. "Global Institutions in a Cooperative Order: Does the United Nations Fit In?" In *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Janne E. Nolan, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994, pp. 243-289.

Schear evaluates four of the UN's modes of operation: transparency in armaments, peacekeeping, peace building and enforcement activity. He maintains that "...the UN's rule-making system, which evolved during the cold war but was marginal to the security needs of that era, lends itself rather well to the pursuit of cooperative security" (pp. 244-245).

It is in this context that he evaluates the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He argues that its merits were made apparent as a result of the Gulf War. The subsequent adoption of its founding resolution (46/36L) by a vote of 150-0 reflected "...not only the superficial voguishness of the transparency idea but also some rather frenzied last-minute pork-barrel diplomacy" (p. 255). Western countries, by and large, liked the Register concept. By contrast, developing states felt that it discriminated against arms importing nations. These objections were appeased with a promise to integrate military holdings and procurement through national production into subsequent registers.

Schear maintains that the bureaucratic and cumbersome nature of the Register will make it difficult to modify. Nevertheless, it must be refined or its contribution to transparency in armaments will be modest. On the positive side, the Register could provide an early warning of arms accumulations. On the negative side, there remain several problems: first, transfers of weapon-upgrade packages are not included; second, no agreement is forthcoming on refining its seven arms categories; and, finally, there are several notable omissions (e.g. ground-to-air missiles). Despite these problems, the Register may help to achieve greater openness both internationally and domestically, and contribute to cooperative security.