

of Conventional Arms process. Given the lack of support for including weapons of mass destruction in the UN Register, this would be a welcome development.

Resolution 46/36L also asked the CD to take up the question of including technology with military applications as part of the Register. Several problems with this approach are evident. First, the question of technology transfer in general has surfaced as a major north-south issue in the post-Cold War era. In short, the north continues to insist on controlling the export of sensitive technology to those states which may want to develop weapons of mass destruction. In response the south feels that such behaviour is discriminatory and hinders their economic development, especially when the technology is dual-use in nature. The debates occurring in both the First Committee and the UN Disarmament Commission in this regard make this clear.³⁹ Hence, any attempt to register such technology will exacerbate this conflict.

Knowing this the architects of 46/36L also pushed this issue on to the agenda of the CD. As with weapons of mass destruction, no conclusions or concrete proposals emerged in the 1993 CD session. In essence the debate in the First Committee and the UNDC was replayed in the CD.⁴⁰ Given this evidence it is clear that making technology transfers more transparent, let alone integrating such an effort into the UN Register, is highly unlikely.

But such a conclusion fits with the overall philosophy of the Register, that is, a focus on end items acquired and put into the inventory of states, items that can not only be easily reported but also more readily associated with the prevention of conflict, the major goal of the Register. If the Register remains an *ex post* Register, technology transfer by itself has no meaning except that it eventually ends up in a major weapons system that is part of a 'registered' national accumulation, which may or may not be destabilizing. This is not to say that supplier cartel/control mechanisms such as COCOM, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) do not or cannot serve the purpose of preventing 'rogue' states from acquiring technology which would allow them to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or perhaps advanced conventional weapons that would clearly destabilize a region. Rather, such technology transfer control schemes cannot be part of a confidence building mechanism which is universal and nondiscriminatory. At some future point a consensus may emerge that certain technologies, which can be easily and clearly identified as military in nature, may contribute directly to national accumulations which are 'excessive and destabilizing.' For example, this might be true for early warning and C³I applications. But for the moment such technologies are dual-use and cannot be

³⁹ For a summary, see Wagenmakers *op. cit.*, 20.

⁴⁰ For a summary see 1993 CD Final Report, *op. cit.*, 12-13.