

IV Verification Regimes for Present and Future Formal Multilateral and Regional Agreements, Reciprocal Measures and Unilateral Declarations

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Introduction

In the context of arms control, a verification regime consists of the totality of measures, procedures and methods for acquiring information necessary to assure compliance by the parties with all the provisions of an agreement. Many assume that this totality is encompassed in the formal, negotiated verification provisions found in the text of an arms control agreement; however, these provisions are only a part, not the whole of a comprehensive verification regime. Rounding out and contributing to the verification package are several additional methods and processes.

The parties to a formal arms control agreement will supplement the information derived from implementing the negotiated provisions of a verification regime with data from their NIM, including NTM where available, and from any available CBMs. Because reciprocal measures and unilateral declarations or actions do not contain formal verification provisions, each party and outside interested observer nations will rely upon their NIM, including NTM, and data from available CBMs to ensure that an agreed-upon action is carried out in a timely, thorough and open manner.

When assessing the adequacy or effectiveness of a verification regime, the synergistic effects between elements of the negotiated regime and outside elements should be taken into account. A particularly important outside element is the utilization of CBMs. There is no formal relationship between provisions in a verification regime and CBMs; nevertheless, because CBMs can make an important contribution to enhancing confidence in the effectiveness of the formal verification regime, their informal, but significant relationship with verification techniques should be understood and taken into account. CBMs will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to examples of verification regimes for arms control agreements, reciprocal measures and unilateral declarations.

Negotiators of verification regimes for future, formal *multilateral agreements* may draw upon the experiences associated with implementation of the recently completed CWC. The CWC contains one of the most comprehensive and complex regimes designed to date. Of the 280-page START I agreement, over 200 pages are directly or indirectly related to verification; its extensive, intrusive, "adversarial" verification regime reflects the fact that it was negotiated as a bilateral agreement during the Cold War. In contrast, the CWC seeks to have global membership. While it is not the product of the Cold War, its verification regime also is adversarial in nature. Implementation of the START agreement will be difficult, but implementation of the CWC poses the most complex problem ever faced by an arms control agreement. The extent of its success or failure will directly affect the nature and scope of verification regimes for future multilateral agreements, such as a CTBT, a regime for the BTWC, and possible environmental agreements.

Because the CWC bans all chemical weapons worldwide and imposes wide-ranging inspections to verify this ban, four major issues had to be resolved. Since these types of issues could affect future multilateral agreements, they should be briefly analysed:

- 1) the serious definitional problems associated with what constitutes "chemical weapons";
- 2) the efficient operation of the implementing bureaucracy;
- 3) the achievement of effective verification; and
- 4) the co-operation and support of the international chemical industry in implementing the verification regime.

For any arms control agreement to be effective, it is essential that all parties clearly understand what is prohibited and what is permitted. In the case of the CWC, chemical weapons are carefully defined, and there are three lists or "schedules" of controlled chemicals which

