

## PREFACE

In the latter part of February 1993, a small group of arms control and Asia specialists convened at Hatley Castle, the baronial centrepiece of Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, British Columbia, to discuss the greatest threat to the security of the Asia-Pacific region -- political and military instability on the Korean peninsula. The members of the External Affairs-sponsored Co-operative Research Workshop consisted of academics, verification experts, diplomats, senior serving and retired military officers, and authorities on arms control. Their deliberations, masterfully distilled in Jim Macintosh's summary which follows, extended over two days of intense debate.

That debate highlighted a number of critical concerns. First and foremost were the dangers associated with the apparent acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by the Democratic Peoples Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK). To the outside world Pyongyang appears paranoid, secretive and unpredictable. One of the challenges facing the participants was how to gain a better appreciation of the decision making culture of that reclusive regime; how to encourage the political will needed to bring about constructive dialogue between the two peninsular nations. In this regard, there was a division of opinion as to whether the DPRK's dwindling inventory of security and economic options would render the North more or less open to dialogue. Generally speaking, the participants were far from sanguine about the prospects of resolving tensions on the peninsula and the prudence -- not to say prescience -- that suffused many of the interventions appears to have been borne out by the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Pyongyang's bellicose pronouncements early in March; actions which may suggest some intense struggle unfolding at the uppermost levels of the power structure in the North.

The members of the Workshop paid a good deal of attention to the European confidence-building process on the grounds that there were some instructive similarities between the polarized state of Europe in the times past and the standoff between Pyongyang and Seoul. The latter situation, however, rooted as it is in the legacy of the Korean War and the incipient civil war thereafter, is even more intractable than the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact appears to have been. Workshop commentaries underscored the depth of distrust which exists between the two Koreas. Equally disconcerting was the elusive and complex nature of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) themselves. If European style CBMs are to be employed to combat that distrust, it is essential that the subtle psychology and epistemology of confidence-building be fully understood. Were CBMs, the delegates asked, a meaningless mantra or a mechanism for increased stability through the transformation of