

Throughout the planning period for the new negotiations, Canada drew attention to surprise attack as an important factor. The Defence White Paper suggested that negotiations should focus on establishing a more stable balance of forces "to reduce the likelihood of war occurring as a result of miscalculation or surprise attack."<sup>37</sup> The continuing thrust of Soviet actions, however was contrary to their declaratory policy. Canadian perceptions of Soviet actions were spelled out in testimony during parliamentary hearings: "Soviet doctrine, training and field exercises, as well as their equipment indicates their intention in the event of war to utilize deception and surprise to achieve their aims."<sup>38</sup>

The mandate for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), agreed among the members of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact, includes as an objective "the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack."<sup>39</sup> For the first time in negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe the capability for surprise attack has been identified by both sides as a priority problem to be resolved through reductions in armaments. For NATO countries the requirement is "the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands of Warsaw Pact weapons relevant to surprise attack, among them tanks and artillery pieces."<sup>40</sup>

### Geostrategic Positions of NATO and the Warsaw Pact

NATO's geography, with two members on one side of the Atlantic and fourteen on the other, occupying a relatively narrow strip of land in mainland Europe, creates problems and special requirements both for defence and for arms control and disarmament. The situation is compounded by the Warsaw Pact being a contiguous grouping of

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<sup>37</sup> Challenge and Commitment, Ottawa, 1987, p. 27.

<sup>38</sup> Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, Issue No. 14, Ottawa, 9 February 1988, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup> The text of the mandate is included as an appendix to this paper. It has been characterized as providing more clearly stated objectives and guidelines than have been available at the beginning of other arms control negotiations. See The Honourable Mary Collins, "Speech to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to mark the Opening of New Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control in Europe," Department of External Affairs, Statement 89/09, 7 March 1989.

<sup>40</sup> "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraph 15.