

a majority on that committee. Then, when it came to the General Assembly itself, the Indians got up and said that this resolution had not received a two-thirds majority in the committee, that the Soviet Union and France were known to oppose it, and that it was a Canadian-Irish fad that not only was going to cost every member state more money but [that] would divide the whole United Nations. It was true that the Soviet Union was opposed, but the Indians took the lead in the Assembly debate, and our resolution failed to receive the required majority.

"Trudeau seemed to lose faith in the United Nations until nearly the end of his term of office as prime minister, when he suddenly came 'round to the idea of using the UN for launching his proposal for a strategy of suffocation at the First Special Session on Disarmament. Back in 1968 and 1969 I could hardly get him to the UN; he came only once when we were on the Security Council. This disillusioning experience in 1966, I believe, had a great deal to do with it. He had heard so much about Canada's influence, and then saw right before his eyes how we were totally outvoted and outmaneuvered by the Afro-Asians on what were for us important issues.

"Two other things annoyed him, when he was down at the UN in 1966. One was that he felt that Canada was shilly-shallying on the Chinese representation issue, that we should come out clearly [that] we recognized Communist China or we didn't, and that this 'Two China' thing was really for the birds. He felt strongly that this was nonsense, and he was absolutely right. He was very frank in saying he was recommending to Pearson that we shouldn't touch this China-Taiwan scheme, that you either recognize China or you recognize Taiwan, and that it was time to recognize China.

"The other issue was South Africa. This was strange, in the light of what he didn't do when he became prime minister; but he said that we were being inconsistent on South Africa, that if we opposed *apartheid* and had voted (as we did in December 1966) in the General Assembly that Namibia had to be separated from South Africa and that South Africa's mandate no longer applied, then we had to act on this vote and disconnect economically and do something about *apartheid*. But when he became prime minister, he did not win the day on this issue in Cabinet—or did not persist with these feelings. I wasn't told what happened.

"But to return to the Security Council, it is still a part of the United Nations where you can achieve really worthwhile results. Its worth is often underestimated. In a situation where there is obviously a state of tension between superpowers, their representatives are there and they constantly meet; and at least there is less chance of stumbling into a confrontation over some regional dispute, while gaining time for some compromise either at the UN or outside it.

"I personally saw this in 1967 in the Six-Day War, and it made a great impression on me. There was Khrushchev backing the Arab states and particularly Egypt, which the Soviet Union pushed into what it thought would be a diplomatic coup, including putting the screws on Sharm al-Sheikh and Israel's access to oil. But when they found they had miscalculated and Israel was about to occupy Damascus, they not only used the 'hot line' and accepted an