

Conference to reinforce and improve these elements of the NPT.

Canada also attaches great importance to the disarmament dimension of the NPT. As a country that participates actively in all of the principal multilateral arms control and disarmament fora, we look forward to joining other delegations, in the days ahead, in examining progress that has been made since the last review conference toward fulfilling the disarmament goals enshrined in the NPT.

The NPT has played a central role in curtailing horizontal proliferation by the legal obligations in the first two articles. It is no small accomplishment that there are no nuclear-weapon states beyond the five recognized in the NPT. However, the nuclear activities of some so-called threshold states not party to the NPT give cause for concern. Canada encourages these states, at a minimum, to conform with the NPT obligations that the vast majority of countries have freely accepted. There is legitimate anxiety that risks of insecurity and war increase in proportion to the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, particularly if they are in areas of chronic tension. The security interests of regions like the Middle East and South Asia are ill-served by even the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty undertake, in Article I, to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or in any way contributing to the development of such weapons by any non-nuclear-weapon state. Article II commits the non-nuclear-weapon states adherent to the Treaty to neither receive nor develop nuclear weapons. These all-important obligations enhance regional and international security and allow countries to reinforce their internally-determined national commitment to non-proliferation by adherence to an international treaty.

The fact that over 140 states have made this commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is immensely important to international security, and is a tribute to the world community in our collective efforts to ensure that nuclear energy is

used only for the benefit of humanity and our planet. Canada greatly appreciates the accession of several states to the NPT since the last review conference in 1985...

Canada calls on all states that remain outside the NPT to accede to what has come to be regarded as the most important treaty of the nuclear era. We are particularly optimistic that South Africa will soon accede to the NPT and that other non-parties in Southern Africa will do likewise. Each new party increases the influence of the NPT and universal adherence should remain our ultimate goal. In urging states not party to the NPT to accede, Canada holds out its own example unabashedly; despite having the technology and capability to do so from the earliest days of the nuclear era, Canada declined to develop a capability to produce nuclear weapons and has adhered firmly to this principle ever since.

Strong as the non-proliferation commitments established by Articles I and II of the NPT may be, they are not foolproof. Non-proliferation, above all, is an act of national policy, commitment and even morality that is only partially verifiable by IAEA safeguards and other means.

It is equally true that the political commitments to horizontal non-proliferation in the NPT would be less convincing without the obligations in Article III. These relate to verification of the non-explosive use of nuclear energy through a system of IAEA full-scope safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. All parties must ensure IAEA safeguards apply to the export to any non-nuclear-weapon state of proliferation-relevant nuclear materials and equipment. Article III does not preclude the possibility of nuclear-weapon states entering into voluntary agreements with the IAEA to apply safeguards to some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Such voluntary offers add to the equity of the application of IAEA safeguards under the NPT

regime, and we welcome the extension by the USSR of its voluntary offer as announced earlier this week. The Review Conference should examine ways for safeguards to be extended in nuclear-weapon states, on a cost-effective basis.

As a uniquely-successful international security verification system, IAEA safeguards are based on the timely detection of diversion of safeguarded materials for production of explosive devices or purposes unknown. That there has been no report of diversions of nuclear materials by an NPT party provides confidence that IAEA safeguards are operating effectively in preventing proliferation...

Canada, by its example, is an unreserved supporter of NPT-type IAEA safeguards: in assuring the system's full-

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scope application within Canada; in requiring IAEA safeguards on all Canadian nuclear exports; and in establishing a Canadian safeguards support program. While the Review Conference is not the forum to review in detail the budgetary and other challenges confronting safeguards, we think it must reiterate the importance of safeguards in the NPT context and make constructive suggestions, if possible, to strengthen the safeguards system.

The essential credibility and future relevance of the NPT rests on this basic non-proliferation/IAEA safeguards verification framework. Past review conferences have tended to confirm, often without extensive debate or analysis, that state parties have complied with Articles I through III of the NPT. At this Review Conference, we should be concentrating more attention not only on recognizing that all NPT parties must comply, but on urging them to do everything possible in word and deed to be seen to be complying with these essential NPT commitments.