



evinced, however, a general concern that the Canadian Government at present does not appear to have a policy framework adequate to deal with the growing number of issues affecting the Canadian Arctic, and a strong feeling that the Government should develop a comprehensive security policy for the Arctic.

It was generally agreed that this policy should include a defence/deterrent component and a diplomatic/reassurance component. As regards the former, a number of participants felt that Canada should concentrate its military involvement in the Arctic on activities which provide peacetime surveillance and promote crisis stability, and should resist involvement in programmes which assume nuclear war-fighting. As regards the latter, there was a strong sentiment that Canada should explore arms control and disarmament measures that would reduce the need for a Canadian or other military presence in the Arctic.

Participants offered differing assessments of the strategic importance of the Canadian Arctic, and of the threats to Canada in the region. The potential for increased superpower military activity in the North was noted, as was the fact that Canada has little control over the factors influencing the Arctic's strategic significance. Nevertheless, participants observed that how Canada governs the use of its Arctic territory will affect both Canadian and international security. The Group emphasized that Canada's Arctic policy should strive to minimize superpower competition in the North, and to enhance strategic stability.

Towards these ends, the Group agreed that Canada should provide a system of surveillance, monitoring, and early warning of attack in its Arctic airspace. There was much discussion as to whether Canada should limit its activities to peacetime surveillance and a limited capability for interception or should pursue a capability for comprehensive air defence. Participants generally concluded that Canada should avoid participation in the US Strategic Defence and Air Defence Initiatives. The merits and demerits of Canadian acquisition of

space-based radar were debated. The Group also examined the option of moving to a unilateral or multilateral air surveillance system, as opposed to maintaining the present NORAD framework. The negotiation of strict limits or a ban on air-and-sea-launched cruise missiles was proposed as an arms control alternative for dealing with the air-breathing threat in the North.

The Consultative Group affirmed the importance of being able to monitor intrusions into Canada's waters as a means of contributing to both Canadian security and sovereignty. However, many participants expressed reservations about the use of nuclear-powered attack submarines for maritime surveillance. Passive sonar devices, non-nuclear-powered submarines, and underwater mines were suggested as alternatives....

The Group urged the Canadian Government to explore the possibility of increasing collaboration with other circumpolar states on matters of common concern. It was suggested that Canada could seek cooperation bilaterally or through a circumpolar forum. The pros and cons of a full or partial Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone were debated. As a more feasible option in the near-term, the Group proposed that Canada examine potential confidence-building measures for the Arctic that would reduce the risk of crisis and war.

Some concern was expressed during the meeting about the divergence in opinion between representatives of the strategic studies community and representatives of the peace and disarmament community. Several participants opined, however, that the value of the Consultative Group lies in its position as a unique forum in which individuals of different backgrounds and interests can exchange ideas and seek out common ground. The quality of presentations and discourse at this year's meeting was lauded. It was suggested, however, that certain sectors of society should be more fully represented at future meetings.

Canadian Industry Tackles Verification Problem

Over the past several decades Canada has acquired considerable experience in addressing security issues in several multilateral forums, including those dealing specifically with Europe. As the prospect of a multilateral agreement concerning conventional forces in Europe has increased, so has the desire on the part of the Government to see Canadian industry ready to play a part in any verification arrangements. An industry round table in February 1988, on multilateral arms control verification for conventional forces, was the first step in this process.

The exercise was sponsored by the Department of External Affairs through its Verification Research Programme. First established in October 1983, the Programme focuses its efforts on verification issues related to multilateral arms control agreements.

A Hypothetical Arms Control Agreement

The round table was designed to provide senior industry representatives with a hands-on introduction to the technological and operational requirements of a verification system. To give them a general idea of the complexity of verification issues, they were given a hypothetical agreement: its provisions and the figures used represented an approximation of what might happen in reality. The agreement incorporated confidence-building measures similar to those discussed at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) and force reduction measures such as those discussed at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations and other associated measures in central Europe.

Measures in the hypothetical agreement were designed to reduce surprise attack, unintentional war and intimidation by increasing the predictability of military activities and imposing constraints on military forces. They required such obligations as: