

other; whilst the cavalry brigade and horse artillery of the first corps pitched their tents on the wide heath at the foot of the hills known as the Devil's Jumps.

Few spots in England could be found presenting more picturesque features than the country occupied by the first corps d'armée. The mixture of wide open heaths with frequent commons covered with gorse and fern, intermingled with remnants of ancient forests, and varied by smiling plots of cultivated ground where the old farmhouses and cottages spoke of long continued peace and prosperity, presented an almost ideal picture of an English landscape, the interest and even beauty of which were enhanced by the white tents, and bright uniforms of the soldiery.

The tactical instruction commenced with brigade drills, quickly followed by the manoeuvres of the brigades of the divisions against each other. Thus the staff of the divisions and brigades became acquainted with the regiments, and the soldiers were gradually accustomed to the work that would be required of them in the more extended operations. These brigade field days were succeeded by the manoeuvres of the divisions of the corps, each division in turn acting on the defensive. The corps commanders and their staff served as the umpires, while Sir Thomas Steel and the headquarters staff performed what may be termed the duties of judges. The capacity of the generals for manoeuvring troops was thus tested, and the staff officers were able to estimate and appreciate their several and individual qualities. If for nothing else these manoeuvres would be of considerable value in the opportunity they present for the staff officers of the army to become acquainted with each other. No rules or discipline will make the several portions of our army work well if the superior officers do not pull together. The social qualities and the education of the English public school, which most of our officers possess, contribute to this object, and from no slight groundwork for a really efficient staff, whilst the military education now superadded gives them the knowledge which, during the last European war in which our army was engaged, they were supposed to have wanted.

After about ten days spent in these minor operations, the real work of the mimic campaign commenced. Owing to the absence of a sufficient transport, one corps d'armée was stationary whilst the other occupied moveable camps. Thus, as the first corps concentrated on the broad heaths known as Frensham Common, the second corps remained under canvas at Aldershot, marching out to fight on the open ground round the Devil's Jumps. After the advance on Aldershot, when the first corps under Sir Henry de Bathe turned the flank of Sir John Douglas, and completely rolling up his right wing carried the position which the latter general had endeavoured to protect with too extended a line, the second corps retired northward, and encamped on the moorland at Coldingly, subsequently taking up a position near Hartford bridge flats. Owing to the exceptionally wet weather the actual days of manoeuvring were somewhat curtailed; but a sufficient number of actions was fought to give rise to many questions and to solve many problems. Before following out the lessons thus learnt, a general sketch of the mode of conducting this veritable *kriegspiel* will conduce to a clear appreciation of its value. A general idea conveyed in few words was issued from headquarters prior to each day's operations. This idea usually stated which army was supposed to be on the defensive, and what lines it was to

defend. The time for the troops to leave their respective camps was laid down, and the bounds of the ground over which operations were to extend fixed. The generals commanding the corps d'armée, by the help of maps, and of the surveys executed by the staff officers, and usually after consultation with their division commanders, then issued short general orders, directing the divisions to move by certain roads and take up or attack certain positions, the details of the movements being left to the division and brigade generals.

Frequently the lessons of the *kriegspiel* were employed to assist in the development of the plans, and it was not unusual for the staff to work out on maps, with the help of models, the movements which the troops were to make on the subsequent day. The combined employment of personal recognisances, with the use of maps, proved to be one of the best lessons for a staff officer, and afforded practical evidence of the possession of a cultivated intellect, united to the bodily activity necessary to ride over rough ground: in fact the teachings of the military college and of the hunting field were well combined. The necessity of fixing and strictly insisting on the exact time for the departure of the troops from their camps, arose from the limited extent of ground available, and the need, in some degree, of husbanding the strength of the men. General officers became so keen in the mimic war, that every stratagem was thought fair, and a few minutes gained by the cavalry in leaving camp, might make or mar the best arranged schemes: consequently the headquarters staff and the umpires had to keep a sharp look out, lest a fast watch on one side or the other should accelerate the movements of the troops.

Exactly at the appointed hour, the several divisions and brigades, standing ready on their private parade grounds, would receive the order to march, and the cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, would be pushed well to the front, either to seize some important position, or, acting as the eyes of the army, to endeavour to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements. The due performance of this duty, probably the most important that cavalry will in modern warfare be called on to perform, was strictly insisted upon by the Duke of Cambridge, who had to combat the natural desire on the part of cavalry generals to keep their regiments in hand. The terrible effect of modern smart arms, their power of being rapidly loaded, and their great accuracy, prevent cavalry, except under very exceptional circumstances, from approaching infantry, whilst the broken surface of a cultivated country would, under any circumstances, greatly restrict their movements, except in very small bodies; consequently, the more advanced cavalry soldiers recognise the fact that the rôle of cavalry has changed, and that whilst as important as they ever were to the success of an army, their duties are more those of the dragoon or mounted rifleman than of the *sabreur*. To conceal the operations of their own army, and to ascertain and restrict the movements of the enemy, to extend the influence of an invading force over a wide extent of country, or to prevent an enemy from availing himself of the resources of the neighbourhood through which he may be marching, will be their chief duties, requiring great personal activity, both of man and horse, and an amount of intelligence which must rise, and has already influenced, the character of the officers and men of the cavalry service. Possibly a few regiments might be kept in hand for some decisive engagement, but

the mass of the cavalry must be pushed to the front, preparing the way for battle—but, as the masses close, leaving the field clear for the deadly rifle. During the late summer manoeuvres, the restricted field operations prevented the cavalry from deriving the full amount of benefit that a more extended arena would have afforded; but enough was seen to impress on all a most instructive lesson on the employment of this important arm. With the cavalry scouts, parties of signal men rode, prepared to take up their positions on any eminence which would facilitate their signalling by means of flags the messages to the superior officers in rear. This method of conveying intelligence was much employed in the American war, where the field telegraph received great supplementary aid from the signal parties, and where the latter, as was the case when Sherman's line of communication was cut on his advance on Atlanta, retained their powers of sending intelligence when the telegraph wires had been broken. The formation of the advanced guards of the infantry columns demanded and obtained careful consideration, and the advantage of pushing artillery forward to cover the deployment of the infantry and to protect the advance of the skirmishers was fully recognised. The march and movements of the main columns were frequently interfered with by the necessity of avoiding damage to corps and fences; and it was a somewhat difficult task for the umpires, first to imagine, and then to impress on the opposite side the idea of the deployment of troops who might really be huddled together in column of route between the roadside hedges.

Having alluded to these much abused individuals—viz., the officers who were detailed to act as umpires, and who, of course, pleased no one, it may be interesting to see what their duties were. As the troops joined in battle, first in small bodies and then in masses, when the supports and reserves were brought under fire, the umpires had to decide which side was to yield ground. Giving due allowance to the nature of the position, the numbers engaged, and, most difficult of all, the effect of artillery fire, when a few puffs of smoke at nearly a mile distant alone showed that batteries were firing on the lines of attack, or were enfilading the position taken up by the defenders, their decisions had to be delivered rapidly as well as judicially, and their opinions were severely criticised by those who suffered from them. Their second duty was to keep the peace between the belligerents, to restrain the troops, as excited by the mimic war, they pressed forward somewhat too eagerly, and to prevent a sham action from being converted into serious combat. Soldiers, and even officers, became so imbued with the spirit of the conflict, that they would have been only too happy if permitted to fight it out in reality. Many stories are told in illustration of this feeling: it was said to be dangerous for a Highland regiment to be engaged with the troops whose ancestors were involved in what is known as the massacre of Glencoe; whilst, at one of the earlier manoeuvres a pugnacious colonel of militia is narrated to have taken off his coat when his regiment became involved in a wood, and to have offered to fight, in any way he liked, the colonel of the opposing force. The umpires have also to put troops who have suffered severely out of action—i.e., to kill them; and it is somewhat trying for keen soldiers hurrying rapidly to the front, to be suddenly stopped in their career, and ordered to pile arms and lie down, although towards the close of a