

sidered this adorable subject, it appeared to all our bishops together, that the consubstantiality was to be defined as of faith, in the same manner as this faith had been transmitted by our fathers after the apostles." You see here a fundamental question solemnly decided according to both authorities, according to scripture upon which Arius placed his reliance, and according to the tradition of the holy fathers, conformably with which the decision was carried. This single fact of itself crumbles to ruins the principle of the Reformation, and shows how far it has wandered from the ancient way.

But I will now adduce something else, quite of a different character, but equally powerful for my purpose; another question of importance, celebrated for its antagonists, who were, on the one side the head of the church, on the other, the primate of Africa; and which after having agitated and divided the Church for nearly a century, was definitively decided without any possible recurrence to Scripture, *by tradition alone*, in this same general council. I am alluding to the question of re-baptization. In vain would they search the Scripture for the manner in which heretics were to be received into the Church: whether they must be admitted with the baptism they had received out of the Church, or whether it must be again administered. You are aware, Sir, how intimately this question is connected with salvation, and how fatal would be the mistake, if their baptism were null and it were not conferred again in the Church. As the Scripture did not speak to the point, every thing was decided by the practice of the Churches. But at the time when the question arose, this practice was not as yet generally known; the conversion, the return of heretics, not being at that time an every day occurrence, or even so frequent as that in every country. Saint Cyprian observing that in Africa they were received without a renewal of their baptism, and being ignorant also of the practice in remote countries, was induced by many plausible reasons to believe, that this custom was injurious to the true principles of the Church and its faith. He assembled his brethren at Carthage, and in concert with them he decided, that from that time forward they should change their method, and that baptism should be conferred anew upon all those who should relinquish their heresy. This decision made a noise: Stephen, the successor of Peter, proclaimed the voice of tradition from his chief and supreme chair. Saint Cyprian, supposing that this tradition was neither general nor ancient, did not submit. The dispute continued, and was only settled by the decision of the council of Nice, which admitted without a renewal of baptism all heretics, except the disciples of Paul of Samosata, who altered the form it. "We ourselves," says St. Augustine, speaking of the quarrel between Cyprian and the pope, "we should not dare to affirm with St. Stephen the validity of such a baptism, had it not been confirmed by the most perfect agreement of the Catholic church, to whose authority St. Cyprian would have submitted," if in his

time a general council had cleared up and decided the question." The reformed religion must surrender itself to the evidence of this fact, and must acknowledge, with the great council of Nice, that scripture alone does not contain every essential, and that tradition can supply its silence; since here in default of the sacred books, every thing is decided by the ancient and general belief, justly considered as the doctrine of the apostles.

To be Continued.

ON THE EDUCATION OF CANADA.

Kingston, May 1831.

To the Editor of the Catholic.

CONTINUED.

BUT upon what principle would he have that portion of education which alone engrosses his attention, conducted. After informing the public with so much pomposity of *his long and extensive observation*, we might very naturally expect that he would deign to explain, or at least make an allusion to this principle. But no. Perhaps after all, to be silent upon this point was the most prudential idea that occurred to him during the composition of his remarks.

Since then nothing can be gleaned, relative to the principle on which a good system of education should be grounded, from *the long and extensive observation* of the Courant, let us endeavor to discover it elsewhere. I shall not speak of the qualities of teachers, or of the method to be followed in the act of teaching. I am afraid that what I shall have to say on the general principle of education will take up but too much time.

The necessity of education arises from the *perfectibility* of human nature. Animals come into life with an instinct, which, without any instruction suffices for their wants. But man is born in a state of ignorance and weakness, which requires instruction, and in order to receive this instruction he is endowed [with the capability of learning.— Animals may then be said to come into life *perfect*; man to come into life, possessing only *susceptibility of perfection*. Now education is the means by which man is raised or taught how to raise himself to the degree of perfection of which he is capable. But upon what principles must education be conducted in order to attain this end? In order to discover these principles we must know the faculties which man possesses. Man is composed of soul and body. I lay aside the education of the body, since the Courant takes no notice of it. But what are the faculties of the soul? They are generally divided into understanding and will. Under the will are comprehended our passions, appetites and affections. The education of the will, that is to say, the direction of our passions, appetites and affections form an essential part of the Jesuit system, and every reasonable man feels the importance of this department of education. It seems however, as I have already proved, not to enter into the Courant's system. I therefore lay that aside, to come to the only point which the Courant seems to notice, namely, to the education of the understanding. Laying aside metaphysical subtleties, the

understanding comprehends the faculties of memory, imagination and judgment. The education of the understanding tends to perfect these three faculties.

But what method should be followed in perfecting them? To discover this method we must study their natural development. For it is useless to go against nature in this point. Let us then study nature. Although the child in coming into existence possesses these faculties, he possesses them only in a potential or dormant state: they do not come into activity, or the child cannot exercise them before a certain age. Experience shows that the first of these faculties which we have the power of exercising, is memory, then memory with a slight degree of judgment, and of imagination; afterwards the imagination expands with a greater share of judgment; at length judgment or the reasoning faculty acquires its full powers. The state of simple memory, that is to say of memory unaccompanied by imagination or judgment, is that which precedes the use of reason; for the actions of children, which seem, before that period, to indicate some judgment can hardly be attributed to any thing but to memory accompanied by a kind of instinct.

The state of memory accompanied by a slight degree of imagination and judgment begins at that period at which a child is commonly said, to have come to the use of reason, & continues in the generality of children till about the age of thirteen or fourteen; in many till later. At this age the imagination begins to be more distinctly perceived.— About the age of fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, (in some later) the judgment or reasoning faculty begins to acquire some solidity.

As there is no question here of beginning the child's public education before he attains the use of reason, let us, for the sake of brevity and clearness call the three subsequent periods, just mentioned, the states of memory, imagination, and judgment; recollecting however, that in the state of memory we suppose some degree of judgment: for otherwise the child could not be said to enjoy the use of reason. I believe none will deny that this is the natural order of the development of the faculties. Now, as the assemblage of these faculties constitutes the understanding, the perfecting of the understanding depends upon the perfecting of which they are capable. But the perfecting of these faculties depends upon the degree of development, which they have attained. Consequently education, which is the means of perfecting them, must be adapted to their gradual development. But we have just seen that the memory is first developed, then the imagination, last of all the judgment. Therefore education should be directed first, to the cultivation of the memory, secondly, to the cultivation of the imagination, lastly, to the cultivation of the judgment or reasoning faculty.

Such then is the principle upon which the Jesuits grounded that branch of their education which relates to the cultivation of the understanding. Such is the principle which the first colleges of Canada