notwithstanding the disclaimers and the casuistry, the charge of making God the author of sin stands good against the Confession.

Another attempt to evade this point, may demand a passing notice. We are told—as a last resort—that the Calvinistic decree cannot make God the author of sin; for, as He is under no law, He cannot transgress, therefore cannot sin. But this argument confounds together God's personal acts with those acts which, by His decree, He causes His responsible creatures to commit. "With respect to His own acts, it is not contended that He breaks the law personally. What is contended is this: that God decrees a law, the transgression of which, by man, is sin; that He places man under that law, and impels him to those transgressions of it that are sinful. Thus, He causes sin, by impelling man to transgress the law under which he was placed. The act of sin in this case is God's proper, though not personal act; and if there be any sin, He is not only the author of the sin, but the sinner himself." To doubt the reasonableness of this, would be to doubt human intelligence. In spite of all disclaimers, and all sophisms, the charge of making God the author of sin stands fully proved against the Confession of faith.

We now proceed to notice the havor this decree makes of man. We charge that it is inconsistent with man's free agency and responsibility. These points we proceed now to examine. The Confession gives us the following deliverance on this subject: "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil,"—Chap. ix. Sec. 1.

The chapter on "God's Eternal Decrees," already quoted, says that God did "freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass," yet so as thereby no "violence is offered to the will of the creature."

Just a few questions arise on this. If man is really free in the volitions of his will, he must be the efficient cause of these volitions. Now we would like to know how an absolute and unconditional decree of whatsoever comes to pass in time can consist with freedom of creaturely volitions? If they can come to pass independent of the decree, then something comes to pass which was not decreed. And what then becomes of the Confession?