

stance, relation, or conjuncture of man's existence, the question of right and wrong comes in. The writer on moral philosophy may say with the satirist: "*Quidquid agunt homines nostri est farrago libelli.*" So much as to the theme with which I shall deal in the present paper. Now as to my treatment of it. First, I shall indicate what I hold to be the only true doctrine of right and wrong: the most effective way of opposing what is false is by exhibiting what is true. I shall then point in brief outline, and as if by a few strokes of a pencil, to the essential characteristics of the great apostasy from that doctrine which is so striking a sign of our times, and touch on some of its practical fruits.

Now let us go by the facts. What is the first fact about man? Surely it is the unity of consciousness. I say the most certain portion of all my knowledge is that *I*—the thinking being—exist. In strictness all my knowledge is subjective. Of what is external to myself I know nothing except its potentialities. The *Ichheit des Ego*, as the Germans call it, the selfhood of the me, is the ultimate fact of man's existence. Of course you may explain away that fact, as you may explain away anything. You may dissolve the Ego into "a willy-nilly current of sensation." You may make of consciousness an accidental and superficial effect of mechanism; you may exhibit men as a mere sequence of physical action and reaction. I do not propose here to examine these views. The time would fail me. And, indeed, I have elsewhere done so. It is from necessity, therefore, and not from arrogance, that I treat them now as sophisms, and take my stand upon the cardinal facts of the unity of consciousness, the individuality and permanency of the Ego. As I have said in my book, "On Right and Wrong" (and I venture to quote my words, because I can not find others to express my meaning better):

"These facts, however complex and obscure—and I fully recognize their complexity and obscurity—are the stumbling-stone of every school of materialists, just as they are the adamant foundation of all spiritual philosophy. And the writer who seeks to explain them away, who asks me to believe, upon his *ipse dixit*, that consciousness is a mere fortuitous result of mechanism, that thought is a mere cerebral secretion, that the Ego is a mere sensation, is a dogmatist who makes far greater demands upon my faith than any medieval hagiologist or Talmudic commentator. I know not any article of any creed, which so largely taxes my credulity, as does the proposition that there can be consciousness without personality, memory without identity, duty without liberty."

I found myself, therefore, on the primary fact which the intellect reveals to us as soon as the act of thinking takes place in our consciousness—the distinction between self and non-self. I go on to another fact which not even the most strenuous professor of what is called autonomous morality will deny, however he may seek to explain it—I shall consider some of the explanations presently—that this distinction is always accompanied by the idea of moral obligation. This idea—call it sense if you will—is also a primordial fact of human nature. Aristotle in his "Politics" accounts it the special attribute of man,