

circumstances and in our own interests we may be obliged to deal—as we already have been obliged to do—at Geneva and elsewhere with that government in respect of certain problems which cannot be solved without it. Nor should we, I suggest, base our policy on the likelihood of the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek returning to power on the mainland. Furthermore, the anomaly of that government representing China at the United Nations, with a veto that can block any action desired by 52 other members, is becoming increasingly apparent. I believe also that we should accept no commitment to intervene on behalf of the nationalist government in the struggle for the Chinese off-shore island. Our view on this matter has already been made clear in this House, outside this House and in the United States.

As for Formosa, the only commitment—and this also has been stated in the House—we have is that which might arise out of our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. So far as diplomatic recognition is concerned, we should from time to time review the position in the light of conditions; of our interests and of the views of our friends and allies. However, I believe we should not get ourselves into such an inflexible position that a change in policy, if it were considered to be wise and necessary, could be brought about only with maximum difficulty.

I should like to express one further thought on this subject. We are all concerned, and rightly so, that the utmost in good judgment be applied to this complicated and controversial problem of legal recognition. As I see it, however, we must not let it distract us so much that we ignore the longer term issues which are raised by communist China's emergency as a new and powerful force in the world. The consolidation and growth of Chinese power under communist rule which is now taking place may be historically as important an event as the Russian revolution of 1917. The implications for us in China's determined drive to achieve military and industrial might and a position as a world power may be as far reaching as similar developments which have taken place in Russia. Indeed, one day in the future these two revolutionary forces may clash. It may now seem to us to be of great importance to recognize or not to recognize the communist regime in Peking. It is of far greater importance to recognize that a revolution of cataclysmic force has taken place in China as a fateful part of the emergence of a modern awakened Asia . . .

Objectives of Soviet Policies

Hon. members will recall the feeling of optimism that was developed at the summit meeting as it is now called, at Geneva last summer: It may well be that hopes at that time were too high and that thinking was too wishful. I remember, along with others, taking that view in this House in the discussion we had on July 23 last year. At that time I, along with a good many others, felt that the real test of the reality and importance of the Geneva spirit was to be the foreign ministers' meeting which was called for November in an effort to achieve some of the objectives of the summit meeting.

We now know that the results of that November meeting was almost 100 per cent negative. We learned at that time that Soviet words differed from Soviet deeds, and that Soviet tactics were not the same as Soviet policy. As hon. members will recall, as a result of that foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva in November, not a single basic objective of Soviet policy was changed.