

crusade against intemperance, and to assist them in procuring a better observance of the Sabbath. Within his own archiepiscopal diocese matters have not always gone as smoothly as he could have wished, and a bishop of weaker fibre than Mgr. Taschereau would have felt his position almost intolerable. With stern and immovable purpose, he has again and again encountered the forces of the Jesuits, and finally defeated them along the whole line. In many instances it was war to the death; but the Archbishop proved himself more than a match even for a Society that has never been overscrupulous in its methods. The embers of discontent still linger among the Castor Party; but the recent agitation in this Province has disturbed the old political lines, and it is doubtful if any politico-religious party will ever again be able to make headway in Quebec. The promotion of Archbishop Taschereau signalizes the death of the Jesuit party in Canada, and the inauguration of a more liberal policy, which will in the end prove most beneficial to the interests of the Roman Church on this continent. But, more than this, the elevation of Mgr. Taschereau to the high dignity of a Prince of the Roman See is a deserved compliment to the whole French-Canadian race. If we except the Irish there is no people on the face of the earth more devoted to the Roman Catholic Church than the French of Lower Canada. Their loyalty to that Church is constant, unswerving, and thoroughly unselfish; and the simplicity of their lives, when uncontaminated by politics, and the purity of their priesthood, are points of which any Church might well feel proud. The French-Canadians are a simple, peaceful, and law-abiding people, and, as a Protestant, I make free to say that in the whole College of Cardinals there is no one better entitled to the dignity than Archbishop Taschereau.

NEMO.

### THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

ON Saturday evening, March 20, the members of the Canadian Institute assembled to listen to a paper by Mr. A. E. Kingsford, M.A., upon "The Campaign of 1815," which proved to be a most careful analysis, reached by the study of all the authorities, English, French, and Prussian, of the causes that led to Napoleon's memorable defeat.

The lecturer showed how in a line running west-north-west and east-south-east, whose central point was about twenty miles south of Brussels, stretched the British and Prussian lines, the British left slightly overlapping the Prussian right a little at Quatre Bras, which was not far from the central point mentioned, and on the high road from Charleroi to the capital; how the British centre lay at Nivelles, and the British right at Ath, and how Wellington persisted in thinking, despite all reports to the contrary, that the French would make for one or both of these points, taking the most natural roads available to them; and how, even when the French had advanced by three columns to Charleroi, and Prince Bernhard with 4,000 men alone disputed Ney's passage at Frasne (some four miles south of Quatre Bras), the Duke actually ordered General Provencher with 3,000 Dutch Belgians to retreat from Quatre Bras to Nivelles, but Provencher fortunately disobeyed him. Yet, when all seemed ripe for Napoleon to sever the two allied armies, and crush first one and then the other, a few of the strangest blunders, mainly accidental, were proved to have turned victory into defeat.

Through Ney's failing to well concentrate his troops, Prince Bernhard and General Provencher had made a good defence of Frasne, when at an early hour on the 16th of June they fell back upon Quatre Bras. Ney, who had been a long while in bringing up 17,000 men against them, receiving Napoleon's order for an advance at nine o'clock, waited on until one for the arrival of 20,000 more under General Dirlon, who had lingered on the road behind him. But Dirlon, upon riding up a little ahead of his men, was met by an aide-de-camp, who showed him a pencilled order from Napoleon, bidding him come to his aid near Ligny, where he was about to engage the Prussians, and who assured him that Ney had already seen it and consented, which was not the fact. The order must have been hastily given, in contradiction of after-plans, as well as of Napoleon's original scheme; for when Dirlon's troops came in sight the Emperor actually sent an aide-de-camp to find out whether they were friends or foes. The former being ascertained, they were ordered to roll the right flank of the Prussians in upon its centre, which the Emperor was attacking. But meanwhile Ney kept sending messages to Dirlon, urging him to return to him; and at length the bewildered man told off one-quarter of his troops to help the Emperor, which was too little for the task, and marched back the rest to Ney, whom they reached too late. Had these 20,000 men remained with Napoleon in the second place, the defeat of the Prussians would have been overwhelming; had they remained with Ney in the first place, they would have opened the road to Brussels. As it was, Wellington

had time to bring up a force of British troops to Quatre Bras; and these, with the first defenders, repulsed the great marshal.

Still Ney had kept the English in play while his master had won the clear victory of Ligny over the Prussians—a victory so dispiriting to his foes as to cause several thousands of the Prussian troops to desert. Let this be followed up, and all would yet be well!

But here arose the most fatal blunder of the campaign.

Wellington retreated from Quatre Bras only to take up a stronger position at Mont St. Jean, near the village of Waterloo; and meanwhile Neisseman, second in command of the Prussian army (for Blücher was desperately wounded), carried out a masterful retreat to Wavre, fifteen miles due north of Ligny and nine to the east of Wellington's position, bringing in his ninety thousand men by five o'clock the next evening. But Napoleon had taken for granted that the Prussians would withdraw eastwards to their old strong point, Namur; and General Gruchy, who was left in command of the French right, remained under that impression during almost the whole of the 17th. When he had informed Napoleon of his mistake, the latter ordered him as he marched northward to keep up continual communication with him by detachments of cavalry; but this he neglected to do.

Early in the morning of the 18th, Blücher sent a despatch to Wellington—"Am pressing on to join you; and if they don't fight us on the 18th, we will fight them on the 19th,"—which was indeed brave, in view of his so recent defeat. Early on the same morning, Napoleon sent a message to Gruchy—"Push on to Wavre." But the Emperor most likely thought that by that time Gruchy was between Waterloo and Wavre, and so able again to intercept the Prussians, whereas his advanced guard was still only half-way between Wavre and Ligny. At half-past eleven, as he sat breakfasting at Sart with two fellow-generals, they heard the firing of the cannon which was the signal for the mighty battle of Waterloo. "It is the Emperor fighting the English," exclaimed his companions. "Let us join him! We will ride towards the sound of the guns." (There was a by-road to Planchenoit, whence the sound came.) But Gruchy showed his latest orders, and persisted in continuing his march. At this moment the foremost of the Prussians, marching from Wavre to join Wellington, had only reached St. Lambert, a village about three miles from Planchenoit; but as the French under Gruchy advanced, they could actually see them moving to effect that much-to-be-prevented union, while there was now no cross-road by which they could be hindered.

Nevertheless, there was some very hot fighting at Wavre. But a part of the Prussians, in a strong position, repulsed Gruchy's Frenchmen; while another part continued to swell the numbers of the English. And thus did the battle of Waterloo become a complete victory for the allies, a disastrous defeat for the French. That the Prussians bore no trifling part in the struggle is proved by the fact that they left nearly 6,300 dead and wounded upon the field, while the actual British loss was just 6,596. Yet it was the British squares which bore for the greater part of the day those repeated charges of the superb French cavalry, and withstood, in a narrow valley, the murderous fire of the powerful French artillery.

M. L. R.

### VULCAN, OR MOTHER EARTH.

UNDER this quaint title, Bishop A. Cleveland Coxe, in the *Forum*, argues against cremation and in favour of burial. The recent establishment of a crematory at Buffalo has probably suggested his theme. The Bishop is too sensible to contend that it makes any difference with regard to the prospects of the soul in the next world what is done with the body in this. So far he would no doubt agree with the late excellent Bishop of Manchester, who refused to oppose himself to cremation. To believe that the body can rise again physically the same is impossible when its particles will have not only been dispersed through the elements, but incorporated in other bodies. The Bishop's arguments are drawn from Church history, custom, and sentiment; and history, custom, and sentiment are strong. It would be difficult to prove that the Christians adopted from the first and universally the practice of burying as that which alone was congenial to their religion. That they did adopt it, however, is certain. Perhaps they were partly led by Jewish precedent, partly by antipathy to Paganism, partly by the idea embodied in St. Paul's metaphor of the seed committed to the ground. At Rome, where they were a persecuted sect, it must have been safer to perform their own funeral service in the Catacombs than at a pyre in the open air. In Egypt, they seem to have been caught by the Egyptian fancy for embalming. Sanitary considerations, we may be pretty sure, never entered their minds any more than they entered the minds of those who afterwards buried in churches. Nor was their practice free from