

makes clear. (Document 152) Though a compromise was eventually reached permitting Canadian logistic units to participate in the force, Pearson was angry that Nasser had been allowed to dictate the composition of the force, a decision he justly feared had lasting implications for UN peacekeeping operations in the region. (Document 168) The section also includes frank Canadian assessments of the impact of the crisis on the UN and the Western alliance. With the easing of the crisis in late November and early December, Pearson and his senior advisors became especially disturbed at Washington's continued willingness to pander to African and Asian opinion in New York at Britain's expense, evidence of what they called "the U.S. double standard of diplomatic conduct." (Document 184)

The chapter on the Suez Crisis traces Canadian diplomacy into 1957, when the international debate on the Middle East was renewed at the 11th General Assembly. An acute sense of crisis persisted during the winter and spring, prompting Pearson to travel frequently to New York, where the General Assembly wrestled with Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip without adequate guarantees for its security. The Minister sympathized with Tel Aviv's demands, and actively resisted efforts to have the General Assembly apply sanctions to Israel. Instead, Pearson sought to ease Israel's fears by expanding the UNEF's role in the region, but his influence was limited in this debate. In the end, American might forced Israel to retreat, leaving an expanded UNEF role still imperfectly defined.

The sections on the Suez Crisis justifiably focus on the diplomatic effort to create and deploy the UNEF, but many of the documents scattered throughout the opening chapter pursue secondary themes of considerable importance. Among them are Canada's views on a Middle East peace settlement, the UN relief effort in the region (Documents 142, 150 and 151), instructions for the commander of the Canadian contingent (Documents 156, 204 and 293), and the legal status of the UNEF. (Documents 186 and 207) In addition, the chapter documents Canada's contribution to clearing the Suez Canal (Documents 211, 213 and 228), and its attitude toward Jewish refugees in Egypt. (Document 205) The chapter concludes with a brief selection of documents on financing the UNEF's operations, an issue that would vex the UN for almost a decade.

The Middle East and the Suez Crisis figure prominently in all four chapters in this volume. Chapter three on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, contains considerable material on the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, including records on the December 1956 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The gathering was supposed to repair the breach in the Alliance, but Pearson was doubtful: "A distrust has arisen ... which is going to persist for a long time. The Council may have – though I am not sure of this – lessened that personal mutual mistrust. It certainly has not removed it." (Document 582)

The Suez Crisis underlined Britain's decline as a Great Power, with clear consequences for the Alliance. This decline, however, had been a long time coming and its effects had already been felt earlier in the year. In June 1956, Pearson had been confronted with British plans to withdraw some forces from Europe. His account of his effort to deflect Eden's government from its course emphasizes the startling ease with which he glided through the top levels of British society. (Document 544) Pearson's success eventually resulted in a review of NATO's military strategy (Documents 544 to 571), part of the "great debate" on the Alliance's future that was kicked off in the spring of 1956, when the North Atlantic Council appointed three ministers to study