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such as those of surprise, admiration, joy, grief, &c., as, "O wretched man that I am!" "Ah me miserable !"

Irony.—Irony is a figure which consists in expressing ourselves in a manner contrary to our thoughts, not however with a view to deceive, but to add force to our observations; as, when we reprove a person for negligence, by saying, "You have taken great care indeed."

Ironical language has often a very strong effect; particularly when used by way of an exhortation; as for instance, when a person has set forth the inconsistency of a thing, he concludes with a feigned encouragement to pursue it. Exclanation and Irony are sometimes united; as in Cicero's Oration for Balbus, where he derides his accuser by saying, "O excellent interpreter of the law! master of antiquity! corrector and amender of our constitution!"

Climax.—Climax consists in heightening all the circumstances of an object or action which we desire to

place in a strong light.

Cicero gives a lively instance of this figure when he says; "It is a crime to put a Roman citizen in bonds; it is the height of guilt to scourge him: little less than parricide to put him to death: what name then shall I give to the act of crucifying him?"

There are several other figures, such as Vision, or Imagery, which represents absent objects as actually present; and Interrogation, when a question is asked with the design of gaining information, but for the purpose of defying contradiction to something already stated.

Balaam addressing himself to Balak says, "The Lord is not a man that He should lie, neither is He the son of a man that He should repent. Hath He said it? and shall He not do it? Hath He spoken it? and shall He not make it good?

LOGIC.

Logic in its extensive sense may be considered as the science, and

the art of reasoning.

It investigates the principles on which argumentation is deduced, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions. As it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a science; but, considered in reference to the practical rules above mentioned, it may be called the art of reasoning.

SECTION I.—Of the Operations of the Mind.

In every argument there are three operations of the mind immediately concerned; namely, Simple Apprehension; Judgement; and

Simple Apprehension is the conception of an objection in the mind, analogous to the perception of the senses. Judgement is the comparing together in the mind of two of the ideas which are the objects of apprehension. Reasoning is the act of proceeding from one judgement to another, founded on the preceding one, or the result of it.

An act of apprehension expressed in language is called a term;