

who was then the American representative, saying, "What's this nonsense of using sanctions against the Israelis? We won't support them." Austin got that cable in the morning. He called Sir Alexander Cadogan to talk to him. Pretty soon all of the delegations were leaving their seats to talk to him. Sobolev and Trygve Lie asked me, "What's going on?" I said, "I think that the Americans have received a cable not to accept any anti-Israeli resolution over this situation down in the Negev. The Americans had to tell this to the British and to the others." They hadn't heard a word about it. Nobody had told them. That's actually what happened. About that time just a day or two later Gideon Rafael of the Israeli delegation -- he wrote this in his book, not mentioning me by name, just saying a member of the Secretariat -- asked me for help in drafting a resolution. I felt it was part of my job. I was liaison with the Israelis under instruction from Trygve Lie and Sobolev. We sat down in a cafe late at night after having dinner together. I helped him draft a resolution which instead of calling on the Israelis to pull back to the pre-Faluja lines which were in the report, it called for the establishment of the Truce Supervision Organization, which would establish truce lines between the parties and that the parties would not be permitted to cross those truce lines. He liked that resolution and sold it to his government. They circulated it