

economy, they lack the monetary and legal frameworks with which to control their dizzying, headlong course. The result has been a series of starts and stops in the national economic programme (such as it is, since in many instances it has developed a life of its own) as much reflective of political manoeuvring on the eve of Deng's death as a desire to regulate the economy.⁵

What are the implications of double digit growth in China? Leaving aside such issues as inflation and corruption, economic growth of this sort has had the effect of committing Beijing to a policy of peace and good order.⁶ Clearly, it is in China's best interest, at least in the short to mid-term, to foster regional stability because that will create an environment conducive to growth. However, there is another side to this phenomenon that is less reassuring. For the first time in many decades China's continental borders are secure. Thus the past decade has witnessed a shift in the military centre of gravity away from the north and northwest toward the south and southeast.⁷ The primary vehicle for displaying Chinese power in the latter regions in the People's Liberation Army Navy.

For many years the Chinese navy was the product of Soviet military doctrine which argued that the PLA(N), like the Soviet navy, was merely an adjunct to the army, intended to repel amphibious assault and provide coastal or flanking protection for the PLA. Now, however, the PLA(N) is undergoing something akin to a Gorshkovian revolution, ceasing to be an auxiliary to the army and becoming a sea-going force in its own right.⁸ Modest shifts within the Chinese defence budget (so far as they can be tracked at all) lend support to this thesis. The evidence suggests that, proportionally, more money may be going to the navy and air force than in times