

power structures) in which the locus has been transferred from the Cabinet to the security actors of the State Security Council (SSC). The SCC is accountable only to the president and even sets the agenda for the Cabinet, further reinforcing the content variables above. The rise of the far right and the South African government's successful suppression of the eighteen-month urban black uprising from 1984 has "taught" white South Africa that force works and that regional and international actors are impotent to significantly constrain government behaviour.

O'Meara concluded, like Chris Brown, that intervention must aim to redress these imbalances and that the preconditions to reducing regional conflict is the dismantling of the system of Apartheid.

### Discussion

#### Power Relations and Legitimacy in Regime Formation

Brown's argument that the present situation in Southern Africa could be explained in terms of military and economic power, rather than in terms of a security regime, initiated a vigorous discussion of whether security regimes can exist in asymmetrical power relationships. In this context, Ron Fisher identified power and legitimacy as two dimensions which must be addressed, e.g., legitimacy in what sense or by whose definition? He suggested that his and Keashly's Contingency Approach to conflict intervention may not prove useful in situations of severe power asymmetry, or in which one or more powers are ideologically driven. The concept of a security regime implies that the lesser party must be able to have some impact on the larger power. As well, in the Southern African case, until re-perception occurs in South Africa (as it did in Rhodesia), a security regime will not develop. Dan O'Meara echoed this sentiment when he stated that until there is some