

on paragraph 3 of article II of the possible provisions of a draft treaty. What this paragraph basically implies is the recognition of so-called on-site inspections "at invitation". We believe that the inclusion of this provision was prompted by the sincere desire of the author, so to say, to "build a bridge" between the two extremes in the position on the control question, that is, to find a generally-acceptable compromise for the speedy and positive solution of this problem. And yet we must keep in mind objective possibilities. The progress of science and technology in the field of seismology and the ever-increasing exchanges of seismological data clearly sustain the argument that the detection and identification of seismic events can be carried out without resorting to on-site inspection. This seriously questions the appropriateness of suggesting a compromise which is in fact tantamount to a retreat from the justified stand taken on the basis of objective findings of modern science and technology. Nevertheless, we believe that this document, coupled with other constructive proposals, may serve as a sound basis for the specific negotiations to be pursued with a view to elaborating a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

30. In this connexion members of the Committee will recall that we have before us the proposal of the United Arab Republic on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests above a threshold of yield with a magnitude of 4.75 accompanied by a moratorium accepted voluntarily by States on underground tests below that threshold (DC/PV.75, para.134; ENDC/144, p.33).

31. Besides the proposals contained in the documents I have mentioned, a number of delegations, including those of Canada, Japan and others, have advanced ideas deserving careful study in the course of our deliberations on the question concerning the further improvement of the seismological methods of detection and identification. Since I have mentioned the recent intervention of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Asakai, I should like now to make a few preliminary remarks in that connexion. We have studied with great interest his suggestions concerning the preparation, so to say, of the scientific and technical basis for the realization of seismological control over the implementation of a future treaty (ENDC/PV.424, para.39 et seq.). It seems to us that these suggestions, as far as they are designed to promote the solution of the question of control without on-site inspection, deserve careful consideration. It may be said incidentally that these suggestions in a sense represent a further elaboration of the ideas put forward in the Joint Memorandum of 16 April 1962 submitted by the eight non-aligned members of this Committee (ENDC/28).

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50. On the question of verification, we have had two distinct proposals. The Soviet Union has proposed free access to all installations beyond the maritime zone on the basis of "reciprocity" (ENDC/240 article 2). The United States, on the other hand, has proposed that there should be free observation by all parties of installations, but further measures of verification such as access to the installation could only be undertaken after consultation between the parties involved (ENDC/249 article III, para.1). We, for our part, see great merit in the Soviet proposal. In fact, the right of observation which the United States proposal purports to give every State is a right which already exists in international law. In other words, the United States proposal does no more than confirm an existing right. We think that the question of verification or control should go beyond the existing right of every State under international law. Therefore, while supporting the Soviet proposal in principle, we do not consider the word "reciprocity" used in the Soviet draft to be appropriate, since it may be construed to imply an exchange of inspections by those who have installations on the sea-bed.