

THE YOUTH OF THE PERIOD.

Sam is rather serious in lecturing, after the style of Supper, over fast youths:—
 I something have to suffer,
 And something have to pay;—
 They tell me I'm a suffer,
 But that's their pleasant way.
 I swear a hat that's early
 About the brim; and tall—
 You'll have to get up early
 To catch this child—that's all.
 I think it rather clever
 To swagger and to swear;
 "Is that good taste?" I never
 Have happened to be there!
 To barmalds 'tis my pleasure
 To utter jokes select—
 "And proper!"—I don't measure,
 To see if they're correct.
 I smoke—but I can't bear it;—
 I drink—it makes me mad;—
 But what's the odds? I swear it
 Confirms me as a cad!
 My coat is too short skirted,
 My trousers are too tight,
 My little soul is dirtied
 With revels over night.
 I've nothing to redeem me,
 I'm small and base and mean,
 And it would most beseech me
 If I were never seen!
 Then spare me—spare me kindly,
 A thing of human blood,
 Though blundering so blindly,
 While crawling in the mud?

NEW YORK AND FOREIGN IRON-CLADS.

We publish this week the official report of that part of the debate in the House on the Naval Appropriation bill, in which Mr. Cox, of New York, was taken to task by Mr. Crooke, also of New York, for asserting that the harbors of our principal cities, that of New York especially, actually present to-day no sufficient defence against the best foreign iron clads. Mr. Cox, as we explained last week, quoted this journal as authority for the statement that such vessels as the *Thunderer* and *Devastation* could enter New York harbor in spite of its existing defences, and hold the chief city of the Union at their mercy. As Mr. Cox intimated, the publication of such a fact may seem indiscreet to some people, but we can assure him and our readers that neither our frank confession nor Mr. Cox's public quotation of it will carry any news to the English naval authorities. It is safe to assume that they are well informed as to the condition of our harbor defences and have not failed to calculate the possibilities of their iron clads. Moreover this question of our defensive power has been so befogged by irrelevant discussion—professional as well as lay, we must acknowledge—wherein spread eagles, like that of Mr. Fernando Wood's speech, and total misapprehension of the elements involved and the new necessities to be met, have taken the place of sound argument and intelligent understanding of the real facts, that it is the part of patriotism and wisdom to expose the exact truth. That is what we tried to do in time to remedy a great evil and prevent a terrible danger; for we are not among those who imagine that even a republic, under the "best government the sun ever shone on," is exempt from the penalties that folly incurs.

Mr. Cox, in pointing out submarine defences as our surest and necessary safeguard against foreign iron clads of power preponderating over that of those of our Navy, pursued the right path; and we are surprised that his words and those of the most competent marine engineers we have did not have the effect of inducing the House to vote more than a meagre appropriation for these instruments of naval defence.

But passing by for the present the subject of attack below the water line, we come to the statement of ours quoted by Mr. Cox, and denied by his colleague, that the *Thunderer* and *Devastation* can enter New York harbor. Mr. Crook declared that "there is not a European iron clad, with full armament on board, which does not draw more than thirty feet of water," and that consequently none could cross the bar at Sandy Hook. Fortunately this is a question of fact and not a subject for argument. Mr. George W. Blunt, one of the New York Pilot Commissioners and a gentleman whose information in regard to the New York harbor is probably more accurate than that of any other authority on the subject, recently told a *New York Times* reporter, in speaking with reference to another matter, that "the bar at Sandy Hook is covered by sufficient depth of water to flood the largest commercial vessel in the world. The *Nu-mancia*, a Spanish iron clad drawing 28 feet two inches, crossed the bar in the summer of 1872."

Now let us see what is the draught of the principal English iron clads, with not only "full armament on board," but also a full supply of coal. We obtain our facts from the reports made to Parliament upon the performances of the ships of the combined Channel and Mediterranean Squadrons, and printed by order of the House of Commons, February 24, 1870

	Forward.	Aft.
Monarch.....	22 ft. 4 in.	25 ft. 6 in.
Agincourt.....	26 " 1 "	27 " 3 1/2 "
Minotaur.....	26 " 0 "	26 " 10 "
Northumberland.....	22 " 2 "	27 " 9 "
Hercules.....	26 " 1 1/2 "	26 " 6 "
Bellerophon.....	22 " 6 "	26 " 4 "
Lord Warden.....	23 " 7 "	27 " 9 "
Prince Consort.....	23 " 9 "	26 " 7 "
Royal Oak.....	23 " 11 "	25 " 3 "
Caledonia.....	24 " 3 "	26 " 8 "
Pallas.....	18 " 8 "	21 " 0 "
<i>Devastation</i> and <i>Thunderer</i>	25 " 9 "	26 " 6 "
Glatton (turret ship) and class—mean draught.....	20 feet.	

In fine, as the above shows, the whole iron-clad fleet of England can enter the harbor of New York so far as the depth of water on the bar is concerned. Moreover, the ships would not be weighted to the degree taken in the table. On arriving at New York their stores of coal would be exhausted, leaving only sufficient in the bunkers for evolutions during the attack, and for returning to Canada, say the port of St. John, or to the Bermudas. This loading of their local would, of course, materially affect their draught and enable them to glide over our bar at ease and with safety. The two most formidable vessels of the English navy, the *Thunderer* and *Devastation*, draw fully equipped but twenty six and a half feet of water. With but four or five hundred tons of coal in their bunkers on entering New York harbor, they would draw only between twenty-four and twenty-five feet, and no one who knows our bar would say they could not, so far as draught is concerned, readily cross it. These vessels, it must be borne in mind, were built with special reference to crossing the Atlantic, and without careful regard to the harbor of New York, into which our English friends do not decay to themselves they might some day be called upon to try to force an entrance. The British naval authorities were not so foolish as Captain Ericsson says in his telegram to Mr. Cox, as to build vessels incapable of crossing the bar of the very harbor intended to be entered.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

At a time when the only power from which we in Canada have anything to fear has suffered its army to dwindle into insignificance, and proposals are before Congress for still further restricting the military strength of the federation, it may seem unnecessary to devote much attention to the question of our defensive preparations. It is matter for sincere congratulation, indeed, that not the tiniest cloud is visible at this moment to excite apprehension. Thanks to the Treaty of Washington, there never was a period since the Declaration of American Independence when the harmony between the people of Canada and our republican neighbours was so unbroken. But though the epoch is not one that calls for any strain or special effort of preparation, the time is all the more favourable for calm consideration of our military organization, and a careful elucidation of the system most advantageous to us. In this view a recent brochure by Lt. Col. Fletcher, Military Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General, is not inopportune, and merits examination.

The pamphlet begins by reviewing the legislation leading up to the present system, which, as is well known, requires the enrolment of the whole male population between the ages of eighteen and sixty, not specially exempted or disqualified. The active militia which stands in the front rank, limited by law to 43,000 men, is raised by voluntary enlistment, and engaged for a term of three years. The degree of efficiency attained under our system is diverse, some of the regiments of Active Militia "comprising very favourably with the best of the Militia of England, others inferior in the matter of training to the very worst." From the ignorance which is apparent, in some instances, as to the existence of faults, Col. Fletcher is led to remark upon the lack of a standard to which the Active Militia would naturally endeavor to conform. As long as the Imperial troops remained in the country, they constituted the first line, and besides affording instructors to the volunteer corps, constantly presented to the latter a high standard of training and efficiency. But the withdrawal and continued absence of regular troops, while no doubt such absence has had its advantages, has deprived our volunteers of a very useful standard of comparison. To supply this want, the writer suggests as a necessity for Canada a small force, well trained, and officered by men who have learned their profession; such force to serve as a training school and as a standard of comparison for the real army composed of the Active and Reserve Militia. The writer proceeds to say:—

"It is suggested to establish in the Dominion three training schools, using those already in existence at Quebec and Kingston and adding another for the maritime provinces, probably at Halifax, where the presence of the regular troops might be of advantage. These training schools should consist of a small force of three arms, viz., cavalry, artillery and infantry, which should correspond with the active militia of the four provinces. The troop, or even half troop, of cavalry would contain the permanent regimental staff of the cavalry of the district, the battery of artillery, in the same