

against public policy and illegal, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Cotton, Fry, and Lopes, L.JJ.). We may observe that precisely the same conclusion was arrived at by our own Court of Appeal, upon an almost identical state of facts: *Hungerford v. Latimer*, 13 Ont. App. 315. At the same time, although there can be little room to doubt that the courts have correctly expounded the law as it is, we think it open to question whether the law might not properly be amended in this particular. Rules of this kind rest on considerations of public policy, and on a supposed regard for what is in the best interests of the public, and we cannot help thinking that in cases of this nature it would better conserve public interests if, under such circumstances, there were power, with the sanction of the judge at the trial, legally to make and enforce such an agreement as that in question.

Notes on Exchanges and Legal Scrap Book.

AN EXPENSIVE PLEADING.—Perhaps the most expensive pleading that was ever framed in any suit was the answer in the celebrated case of *Small v. Atwood*, a copy of which it was sworn would cost £19,000 sterling: *Bennett's Biographical Sketches from the Note-Book of a Reporter*, p. 114.

LIBELLING A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.—A municipal corporation cannot sue for libel. So it was held by Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice Lawrance in *Mayor, etc., of Manchester v. Williams*, in which case the defendant charged that "bribery and corruption had existed and done their nefarious work in the case of two, if not three, departments of the Manchester city council, and that the plaintiffs were either parties thereto, or culpably ignorant thereof," etc. It is of importance to inquire how far this decision is reconcilable with that in *Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Company v. Hawkins*, 4 H. L. 87, the only modern authority on the subject. In that case the defendant imputed to the company insolvency, mismanagement, and an improper and dishonest carrying on of its affairs. It was expressly held that the company could maintain an action, but the court no doubt put its judgment on the ground that the natural result of the defendant's imputation was that the plaintiff's business might be damaged, and Chief Baron Pollock went so far as to say that a corporation could not sue in respect of a charge of corruption, "for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, though the individuals composing it may." There is therefore a great distinction between that case and the recent Manchester case, but the dictum of Chief Baron Pollock is a strong authority in favor of the Manchester case. We are not so sure, however, that the decision in the Manchester case is correct. Supposing, for instance, that a municipal corporation were issuing a loan, would not an imputation of general corruption existing in the town council discourage the public from coming forward as subscribers? We should be glad to see the question argued before a court of appeal.—*The Law Times*.