

From this point the work of Villehardouin is nothing but the recital of military movements; but we are able to distinguish a central idea, and it is that the Greeks of Europe, so horribly treated by their ally John of Bulgaria, now tend to become reconciled with the Latins. The cities close their gates against the Bulgarians, and John is forced to retreat.

The power of the Emperor Henry also increased greatly by his marriage in February, 1207, with the daughter of Boniface of Montferrat, the most powerful and least docile of his vassals, and shortly after a very cordial meeting takes place between Henry and Boniface, where they agree upon future military operations, but Boniface was not fated to appear at the appointed place. He had hardly returned to Mesinople when a horde of Bulgarians commenced to devastate the country around. Upon hearing this, he sprang to horse without armour, and flew against the enemy; but pursuing them too far, he was wounded, and died soon after. It is with this tragic incident that Villehardouin suddenly and somewhat abruptly closes his work. Why is unknown, whether at this point his courage failed him to relate subsequent events, or, what appears more probable, his hand was stopped by death.

And now we come to consider the historical value of the work. The first duty of a historian is exactness, and no one has been able to be more exact than Villehardouin. Concerning the fourth Crusade, he was in a position better than any other person, thanks to his birth and his rank, to see and hear all matters and to give them to posterity. The public and secret motives and councils of this singular enterprise were alike known to him. From the beginning to the end he took part in all the battles and in all the Councils. A man possessing the confidence of the Count of Champagne, and later of the Marquis of Montferrat, the chief of the expedition, a high dignitary of the Empire under Baudouin and Henry, a personal friend of the doge Dandolo, a military genius and a consummate diplomat, he could be ignorant of nothing, because they could have no secrets from him. If then he has erred in his history, it is but just to affirm that it was not through ignorance.

We must acknowledge that he does not state a single fact which is not true, but it is not sufficient for the historian to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, he must also tell the whole truth. To tell without fraud a part of what one knows and to retain the rest may be prudent when one is not quite sure of having acted well, but it has the effect of falsifying history, and of this we must accuse Villehardouin.

The Pope Innocent III caused a Crusade for the deliverance of Jerusalem to be preached. Why and how was the expedition turned from its end? Villehardouin knows the reason well, but his explanations are entirely insufficient. He does all he can to con-

vince us that it was an accident, that it was not in question before the end of the year 1202 when the pilgrims were at Venice. But he is obliged to acknowledge that from the moment of the proclamation of the Marquis of Montferrat as the leader of the expedition, a large number of Crusaders, instead of joining him, take their own way straight to Jerusalem. And, again, why does not our chronicler tell us a word of what happened between the acceptance of the command by Boniface and the reunion of the army at Venice, that is, from September, 1201, to June, 1202? It is because during this time the intrigue was perfected which was to lead the expedition to Constantinople. He passes in silence the fact that Alexis, escaping from the prisons of his uncle, came, in 1201, to Philip of Swabia, and obtained from him a promise of support in the task of replacing Isaac on the throne, that Boniface the cousin of Philip possessed all his confidence, that he went to confer with him at the end of 1201, and received from him the mission of conquering the empire with the aid of the Crusaders in the name of the young prince; and that, in order to justify in the eyes of the Pope the change in the direction of the Crusade and the attack of a Christian state, they both advanced the long desired submission of the Greek Church to the Latin, and that first Alexis and then Boniface went, in the beginning of 1202, to propose the affair to Innocent III, but he, thinking of nothing but Jerusalem, and wishing to owe nothing to his German adversary, refused to countenance the affair, and that his refusal must have been known to a large number of the Crusaders.

In September, 1202, they were at Venice, but the desertions were so many that the army threatened to disperse, and, in order to ensure against this, they put them on board ship and set sail for Zara, without informing them that the chiefs have already decided to go to Constantinople, and were negotiating in this view a treaty with Philip of Swabia. But they are careful to spend six weeks in a journey which ought to occupy but two days. And why is this? Villehardouin wishes to say nothing about it. It is to have time to conclude this treaty, and to attempt once more to obtain the Pope's consent; it is also to gain the winter, — an excellent pretext to postpone the departure for Jerusalem till next spring. Boniface remained behind "for business which he had," as our chronicler tells us simply. This business was the voyage to Rome, where he fails once more before the inflexible will of Innocent. The Pope even severely condemns the expedition against Zara, and enjoins the Crusaders to move at once to the Orient. But of all this, not a word in Villehardouin.

And again in January, 1203, when Boniface rejoins the army in Dalmatia, and submits the proposition of attacking the Greek empire to the barons and prelates,