

nations, we will at once perceive how desirable it is that it should not be liable to seizure under any circumstance. But we should also remember that the dread of a loss so enormous is the best guarantee of the maintenance of peace between them. Indeed, as things stand, neither dares to force on a conflict, knowing what the consequences would be; but remove this safeguard, and we cannot depend on the continuance of friendly relations for a day. The purchase of the Russian possessions on this continent is convincing evidence of the American lust for territory, and the British Provinces are a prize which they would acquire at any price short of the destruction of their shipping and trade at sea. That binds them over, as it were, to keep the peace. It is the same, too, with all the maritime nations; and this has chiefly been the cause why England, from being one of the most warlike, has been converted into the most peaceful of countries.

Besides all this, it is evident that Mr. Field's arguments in support of his views are in some measure based on a false assumption. He says: "The rule of immunity from attack which prevails on land, where the people were in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy's army, ought to obtain much more upon the disturbed and open sea." Now, it is well known that there is no such rule, and there is not always such immunity, though with the advance of civilization, the destruction of private property is much less frequent than it used to be in barbarous times, when an invading army resembled a flight of locusts, destroying everything in their course. Quite apart from all feelings of humanity or generosity, a prudent general preserves the property on his line of march; for to act otherwise would be injuring himself, by cutting off his chief sources of supply, which often he cannot carry with him into the enemy's country, to the extent that he may want. He is mainly actuated by a wise selfishness. But when strategy, safety, or necessity demands a different course, the "rule" is seldom respected. Turenne's terrible sack of the Palatinate, is a notorious case in point; the devastations committed by the French in Portugal, when retreating from before the heights of Torres Vedras, are equally so; and the march of Sherman from Atlanta to Richmond, and that of Sheridan up the valley of the Shenandoah, afford more recent instances of the respect of belligerents for private property on land. In fact, it frequently happens that one of the parties in the war destroys his own property. This was the usual policy of the Scotch, before the union of the crowns, when invaded by an English army; and the Russians in 1812, not only gave their own cities of Smolensk and Moscow to the flames, but laid waste the whole route between these points, burning and destroying everything that could feed or shelter the invader. It is not to be expected that the enemy will show more forbearance on such occasions than the defenders themselves, when they deem it requisite to follow the example thus set them, and they are the only judges of the necessity of the act. We repeat then, that Mr. Field's rule has no existence either in theory or practice of war, by land or by sea.

Nevertheless we heartily wish him God speed in his mission of benevolence and mercy. Should he succeed in persuading the American Government to join the rest of Christendom in the condemnation of privateering, he will do a service to mankind, alike useful and acceptable. Yet Mr. Field ought not to forget that the utmost human exertion can effect is to mitigate the miseries and horrors of war; they cannot be wholly removed. War means murder, robbery, arson, and all the brood of kindred crimes: the axiom *inter arma sil. ut leges* is as true at this day as it was some thousands of years ago, and the primary and a universal rule of the art is to kill or be killed. Revolutions cannot be made with rose-water, the French proverb says: neither can war.

## NOTES ON THE TRADE OF CANADA FOR 1866.

### ARTICLE II.

THERE is a wide field for the expansion of Canadian trade in the West Indies. In spite of the many barriers in the way, a considerable business has sprung up between the different Provinces which compose our new Confederation, and the different Islands which compose the British West Indies. Our transactions should not, however, be confined to the latter. The Spanish West Indies import very largely each year of articles which we raise in British North America, and if once business was begun between us on a

satisfactory basis, our commerce might well to large proportions. The visit paid by our Special Commissioners did good so far, that it proved both to the people of the West Indies and ourselves, that it would be mutually advantageous for us to exchange many of our chief commodities; but unless these recommendations are followed up by more vigorous exertions to foster trade than the Government has yet manifested, we fear little permanent good will ensue.

### IV.—BRITISH WEST INDIES.

During 1866 the volume of our trade with the British West Indies, taken as a whole, was larger than in 1865. Nova Scotia takes the lead in this trade, her transactions being larger than any other of the Provinces, and with good prospects of increase. Beneath we annex a statement of the exports of all parts of British America to these islands for the past two years, with per centage of increase:

Exports to W. Indies.	1865.	1866.	Difference
Canada.....	\$ 41,313 5	63,003 55	inc're
Nova Scotia.....	1,999 459	1,635,673 163	dec're's
New Brunswick.....	38,632	53,076 37	inc're's
Newfoundland.....	231,115	485,657 71	inc're's
Prince E. Island.....	27,240	16,105 43	dec're's

Whilst the above shows, upon the whole, some advance in our British West Indian trade, we certainly think it does not show that expansion which it should do, and which, we trust, will be seen at the close of the present year. The same remark applies also to our importations from the British West Indies, which, however, make a rather better appearance than our exports. The following table gives the amount of purchases made by the different Provinces, New Brunswick excepted, its returns not having yet been published.

Imports from W. Indies.	1865.	1866.	Difference
Canada.....	29,329 4	105,670 49	dec're's
Nova Scotia.....	967 390	1,013,263 51	inc're's
New Brunswick.....	116,049		
Newfoundland.....	131,791	37,039 195	inc're's
Prince Ed. Island.....	23,911	32,540 35	inc're's

Our trade with these islands is but a fraction of what it ought to be. In 1864, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana and Barbadoes alone, imported \$13,216 barrels of flour, in 1865 the amount was \$31,221 barrels, of which the Americans supplied \$12,093, and British America only \$1,222. They annually buy abroad large quantities of lumber, butter, salted meats, dried and wet fish, leather and other articles, which we could supply them with cheaper than our American neighbours. We have also an ample field for the extension of our commerce with the

### V.—SPANISH WEST INDIES.

The annual value of the imports of the West Indies belonging to Spain, is very large, the average being close upon \$150,000,000! A large part of this sum is made up of articles of which Canada produces a surplus, and for which we require a market. The average imports of flour are set down at fourteen millions; meats of different kinds at thirteen, grains at ten, fish at four, furs four and a half, wool ten, and woollen fabrics at two millions each! The following table shows the imports of certain articles into Cuba and Porto Rico, from the United States, during 1864, (with the duties annexed) which Canada might advantageously supply:

ARTICLES.	DUTY IN CUBA.	DUTY IN PORTO RICO.	U.S. VALUE.
Flour.....	4 per bbl.	4 per lb.	\$428,562
Butter.....	4 1/2 per 100 lbs.	2 7/8 per 100 lbs.	252,769
Cheese.....	2 1/2 "	2 1/2 "	169,187
Beef.....	3 1/2 per bbl.	1 1/2 per bbl.	51,563
Pork.....	4 1/2 "	2 1/2 per bbl.	414,941
Lard.....	4 1/2 per 100 lbs.	2 1/8 per 100 lbs.	2,206,561
Hams & Bacon.....	3 1/2 "	2 1/2 "	463,333
Salmon.....	1 1/4 per 100 lbs.	0 7/10 per bbl.	197,840
Mackerel.....	1 1/4 per 100 lbs.	0 6/10 per 100 lbs.	
Godfish.....	5 1/2 per 1000 ft.	2 1/2 per 1000 ft.	735,337
Boards.....	1 1/2 per 1000	0 8/10 per 1000.	10,391
Shingles.....	7 1/4 "	3 1/4 "	718,965
Staves.....	0 30 each.	0 18 each.	1,432,131
Shooks, hhd. box.....	0 22 1/2 "		745,634
Petroleum.....	0 1 1/2 per gal.	0 17 per gal.	396,677

This statement affords abundant evidence that Canada and the Spanish West Indies might easily cultivate a large trade, which would be mutually profitable. In one important respect, business might be carried on with them more readily than with the British West Indies, the latter being so numerous, with different governments and different tariffs. We hope the publication of the above table—which we take from

Mr. Patterson's "Trade and Commerce of Mont eal"—in the *Trade Review*, may induce some of our more enterprising commercial men to test the wealth of Cuba and Porto Rico, which could scarcely fail to prove remunerative.

### VI.—BRAZIL.

During 1866 Brazil bought very little, if anything, produced in Canada, and yet we might have supplied its people with large quantities of provisions and breadstuffs, for we take it for granted that our flour could be manufactured so as to keep fresh in tropical climates. Brazil imports most of the articles enumerated in the Cuban and Porto Rico list, and the scale of duties ranges from 10 to 40 per cent. Most of them we could supply as cheaply as the Americans, from whom they buy largely. To sum up in a sentence: we have in the West Indies and Brazil a wide field for the spread of Canadian commerce, and it is to be hoped the statesmen of our new Dominion will earnestly devote themselves to its development.

## THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILWAY.

LOOKING over "Pine Forests and Haematac clearings," the title of a work published in 1853, by Lieut. Col. Kelgh, we find the following:—

"The spirit of disunion has been further exemplified by the discussions on the railway between Halifax and Quebec. \* \* \* Had the issue been left to the decision of United House of Parliament for all the British North American Provinces, at this moment the railway from Halifax to Quebec would have been in full operation. The fact of the disunion of the Provinces has alone prevented long since, the accomplishment of this great national undertaking, and thereby most materially retarded the progress of the Lower Provinces."

This was written 14 years ago, much valuable time was lost before it was written, and much has been lost since, but we are at length about to abandon (let us hope for ever) the selfish and miserable strife of small and petty sectional differences and to enter on a new career. This railway which thinking men saw 20 years since was an absolute necessity to our political existence, will no longer be delayed by disunion, but we may reasonably hope will shortly be in process of actual construction. It is no part of our purpose to enter largely into the vexed question of choice of route, but from all that has come to our knowledge we incline to the opinion that one of the so called, "Central Routes" will be adopted, and further, that all things considered, it is the route best calculated to advance the interests of New Brunswick, and of the road in general. It is the one best calculated to open up the country for settlement, and few persons out of the Province (and indeed few within it) have anything like an accurate idea of the magnificent country through which the route will necessarily pass by the selection of one of these Central Routes. However, as we said, we do not wish to enter into this part of the question, we rather wish to make a few remarks regarding the commercial prospects of the road itself. A great many well informed people are of opinion that the road can not be made to pay as a commercial speculation. We are not of that opinion, on the contrary, we think if it be properly constructed, and liberal and judicious measures taken with regard to the settlement of the lands in its proximity, that it will in three years from the time of its completion be in a paying condition. As to the construction of the work, great care will be necessary to prevent its falling into the hands of parties, who on the faith of the Government guarantee for as much money as may be necessary, will plunge into an extravagant expenditure. This would be ruinous to the whole affair. Let the superstructure of the road be as solid and substantial as possible, and the gradients and curves as easy as can conveniently be obtained, but there is no need of expensive station buildings, or ornamentation of any kind. Let everything be plain, substantial, and serviceable. The history of the lavish and wasteful expenditure on the Grand Trunk, may afford a useful lesson, and save the country a vast amount of money. We are afraid that the question of gauge must be considered as settled by that in use on the Grand Trunk and Nova Scotia Railways, otherwise a narrower gauge like that on the Norwegian lines might very well have been adopted at a far less expense, and with plenty of rolling stock would probably have proved quite equal to all the requirements of the traffic.

Another very important matter will be the settlement of the public lands through which the road will necessarily pass. Primarily this will rest with the