

tive Senate, but of the reform of the Senate. When they came into power the Senate was reformed and reformed speedily, but not by any act of the Government other than the appointment of new senators to fill the vacancies which had been created by Divine Providence. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that the time has come when we should actually make a change in the system of selecting senators. Government under a democracy requires that the people should govern. The people can only govern through their representatives elected by them to the legislative halls of the country. It was stated at Confederation that the legislative councils were really elected, that they represented the people, and why?—because they were appointed by the Government and the Government was responsible to the people. But that is beating about the bush to my mind in regard to so serious a matter. We have the precedent, in so far as the Conservative party is concerned, of an elective chamber by the Act passed in 1856 by the Tory Government of that time. We have the Liberal party of 1893 declaring in favour of a change in the Senate. If it was not so expressed in words, at any rate what it meant was that there should be a change in the system of constituting the Senate. So, if we are to follow the leaders of the past, this House must do exactly what I am suggesting should be done.

I am not so sure, Mr. Speaker, that it might not be a measure of retributive justice on the Liberal party if this change were made at the present time. They could have made the change when they were in power and had the advantage of their control of the situation to arrange the constituencies to suit themselves, as, it is said, has been done sometimes. Now, if it is done under the ægis of the Conservative Government, with a Conservative Senate in control, the Conservative party will have a very great advantage, because, when this resolution was enacted into law and came into force, the Conservatives would be in a very large majority in the Upper Chamber; they would have the right to arrange the constituencies in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and they would, therefore, have a very considerable advantage.

I should be quite willing that they should have that advantage if they would only accept this proposition and place it on the statute book as the law of the country. As I have said, we have a precedent for an elective Upper Chamber. We see why it was that an elective Upper Chamber was not established at the time of Confedera-

tion. It was not established then because it was impossible to do so. If it had been insisted on at that time Confederation could not have been consummated. We had to take what we could get, and we could not have got that without accepting all that it involved. We have the record of the Liberal party in favour of an elective Upper Chamber and consequently it seems to me that it ought to be easy sailing for this House to pass a resolution such as I have suggested. I do not pretend to say that this resolution is in all its details exactly what it should be, that there should not be amendments; but, in the main I submit that it embodies the principles that should be carried out. To my mind there are three distinct principles which should actuate this House in the establishment of an elective second Chamber: One is that the second Chamber should be elected by the people, and should represent the people. The second is, that its members should be, as far as possible, independent of politics and political feeling and political organization. And the third is that the senators should have an appointment for a term of office long enough to make the Senate a permanent organization, and not one to be affected by a dissolution of Parliament. There should be an election; there should be independence; there should be permanence. I never thought it was the part of wisdom or of good judgment to suggest that something which had been in existence should be torn down and destroyed without having the courage to suggest an alternative proposition. I could have confined my resolution to a suggestion that the change should be made in the constitution and the mode of appointment, and left it at that. But I felt that if I wanted to convince this House of my sincerity in this matter and to convince them that action should be taken, I should at least be in a position to suggest some sort of alternative proposition, and I have taken the liberty to suggest an alternative proposition. I submit that that proposition embodies the three principles which I have suggested and which, if embodied in legislation, would result not perhaps in a more intelligent or higher class of men than the senators we have at present, but in the creation of a Senate responsible to the people of the country and having their confidence. What the senators will do under such a constitution they will do as representatives of the people and not as representatives of