such transfers were banned by international non-proliferation agreements but mostly because the countries involved realized that it was in their interest to be cautious with nuclear exports. In all, new producers seemed to be behaving in an acceptable manner and their sales were generally subject to the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). However, Mr. Potter did point to some areas of concern, including the refusal of some countries to adopt the non-proliferation agreements and the development of ballistic missiles.

Standards governing nuclear trade were in fact in a state of transition. Some new producers (especially Argentina and Brazil) might well feel inclined to subscribe tacitly to the export rules of the London Nuclear Club (LNC), except that their export control systems were not fully developed.

Mr. Potter then turned to some deficiencies in the Soviet Union's export policy. He said that they sold or offered to sell nuclear products that were not subject to international guarantees, to countries which refused to provide full guarantees and to subscribe to the NPT, and which had nuclear programmes for military purposes. In February 1990, the USSR offered to sell a reactor to Pakistan without full guarantees. In addition, two nuclear reactors were offered to India. Last year, the USSR offered heavy water to Argentina without demanding guarantees, and it has held discussions with the Argentinians about signing a research agreement on breeder reactors. Moscow was said to have considered selling a reactor to Israel last April. The Soviets also sold Cuba a 10 MW IRT research reactor that used highly enriched uranium. As a result of Soviet behaviour, some new producers might conclude that there was no advantage to signing NPT and applying complex safeguards.

The session commentator, Harold Klepak, of the Collège Militaire Royale in St-Jean, said that he found Professor Dagnino's talk very informative. He added that studies should be undertaken of the role played by military people in decisions to develop certain military technologies and of their underlying motives, especially the desire for prestige. The abandonment of nuclear programmes for military purposes in Argentina and