

the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement would improve Soviet-American relations and raise new possibilities for cooperation presumably in the European context as well as others.⁸⁰ Certainly Brezhnev is heavily committed to the CSCE, and as of March 1973 Soviet representatives at Helsinki were willing to state there was heavy pressure on them to move forward rapidly. There is no doubt that public opinion in the USSR would cheer the man who ^{convinced} laid to rest the threat of a new European war in the foreseeable future. It is also the case that a policy including concessions and a degree of propaganda restraint has produced positive results for the Soviet Union since 1969. Brezhnev may accordingly seek to move further in a reform direction in the belief that the risks are outweighed both by the probability of new success and by the needs of the USSR. That such a calculation might be made is suggested by the larger situation in which the Soviet system currently finds itself.

(No doubt about this)

IV. The Outlook from Moscow

As it prepares for the opening of the CSCE, Moscow is faced with an overall situation that is both novel and fluid. The character of the current policy setting is itself doubtless a subject of debate, as individuals and organizations seek to secure acceptance of perceptions that favour their own preferences for Soviet policy and undermine