

sends a delegate to the employer. This delegate is often a man of no education, and yet is entrusted with a mission requiring high diplomacy. Is it to be wondered that the employer resents such interference, and determines only to yield the demands made if forced to do so? Whereas if his employees requested that a meeting might be held to discuss the position, and from that meeting a committee of employers and employee could be formed to find a satisfactory solution of the difficulty, the employer would feel that he was being fairly treated and the employees would realise that their interests were in safe hands.

Such a course is perfectly practicable, but it would require a great deal of education to convince labour that it is so. In the first place, it would do away with the labour delegate's occupation and strike a blow at the power of unionism. For once the employee recognises that his employer is directly approachable, he himself would be the first to resent interference from the outside.

This leads naturally to the second question. Is co-operation feasible?

The very fact of mutual interests being amicably discussed would lead insensibly to co-operation. From the employee feeling he had a practical interest, it would be but a short step to wishing for a monetary interest in his employer's business. The more interest his employees shewed in his business the more interest the employer would be likely to give them. Co-operation is not a very difficult problem to solve where the employee looks on his "job" as a permanence, but where casual labour is employed, as, for instance, stevedoring, it is infinitely more difficult. But even in stevedoring it is not an impossibility. Imagine for one moment a ship being loaded by men who were co-operating in the profits resulting therefrom, and whose scale of wages was arranged, not by an arbitrary decision of either employer or employed, but according to the actual cost of loading, plus a percentage of the profit, that percentage to be increased or decreased in proportion to the profit. What would be the result? Is it not obvious that it would be to every man's interest to work harmoniously together, and to get the work done as soon as possible, so as to increase the proportion of their profits? It might seem complicated at first, but a little calculation would make it a simple matter. Co-operation would undoubtedly solve much of the present labour difficulty. It gives a man a stake in his work. It could be supplied in varying forms to almost any trade. A system of bonuses is not at all on the same level as true co-operation, unless the bonuses given are in direct ratio to the profits earned. Perhaps the finest example of co-operation and its effects is shown by the South Metropolitan Gas Company, in London, England, where the workmen not only have a direct share in the profits earned, but are represented on the board by directors selected from among themselves. It would take too much space in a brief paper such as this to go into the details of this system, but it was brought into being by Sir George Livesay to settle a great strike, and has proved most successful. Sir George Livesay published a detailed pamphlet