r, the pass as it that stabil-spects aclude even a they

-chief entify, kably West onferto be se he t and se his l the ungeror the emany ble at

ations.

at the

arlier,

of the


 $\mathbf{Bonn}$ 

l as a constiestern olitical . viewed erspecal ecocise in

Bonn comoil imay by ces to ukuda 7 per apan's year's ionary nd inhis six n my nts esy were ı Can-

group
eva to
l negone final
that:
nuclear
lippage

vth by



C. P. Photo

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and U.S. President Carter are joined in discussion by their host Helmut Schmidt during the July meeing in Bonn. The "Seven" will meet again in Tokyo next summer.

in the execution of nuclear power programs must be reversed." Lastly, the group established for the first time a review mechanism: representatives from the seven countries are scheduled to meet in December to check on each others' progress, and to report back to their leaders.

The list of accomplishments does seem to be a considerable one. Further, as Prime Minister Callaghan put it at the closing press conference: "The whole is greather than the sum of its parts". The combined effect of all these measures should result in reduced protectionism, expanded trade, an attack on unemployment without an incentive to inflation, and a general tone of reassurance that would produce currency stability.

Few of these beneficent results have happened. Such a judgment could be dismissed as premature — except that continued currency instability already marks Bonn as an economic failure.

To ask What Went Wrong? is to ask the wrong question. A better question to ask is What Didn't Go Right?

In part, advance expectations were unrealistic. Bonn was never intended to be "an organ for world economic management" as the *Economist* described it. Bonn is simply the latest evolutionary model in a process that began three years ago at Rambouillet with a vague, futuristic seminar among, at that time, six world leaders. The present seven may dominate the West, but they cannot speak for it—still less for the rest of the world. Their sessions do not constitute an institution but an occasion out of which the most

important product is never going to be binding treaties or detailed plans of action, but rather intangibles like, at Bonn, the restoration of good personal relations between Carter and Schmidt.

In one instance, the seven did indeed demonstrate that their whole was larger than the sum of its parts. The resolution on airplane hijacking constituted, for all of them, a singular achievement, and for Canada a definite diplomatic triumph. Prime Minister Trudeau advanced the idea; External Affairs Minister Don Jamieson and a small group of officials translated it into practical terms, and then successfully negotiated these with the other delegations.

In adopting a firm, clear, innovative and wholly unexpected — stand on hijacking, the seven leaders were performing as politicians can do when they are performing at their best. Yet, contrarily, this very achievement ensured that they would do less than their best on the economic issues that were their first priority. In effect, for a day and a half at the conference the seven leaders allowed themselves to be less bold on economic matters than they would otherwise have been, and ought to have been, because they knew that the final communique would justify itself by containing a bold statement about hijacking.

By no means were all of the economic debates among the seven conducted in "diplomatese". Carter asked some tough — and, by all accounts, exceptionally well-informed — questions about the proposed European "zone of currency stability".

Seven leaders performing as politicians on hijacking