

was felt that we should not try to do anything on our own in this matter, but act jointly with the United Kingdom and the United States. (Mr. N.A. Robertson has expressed a similar view in his telegram No. 1773 of October 11th).† The Chargé in Moscow doubts if any positive action can be expected from the United Kingdom at the present time. He says that the United States Embassy were prepared to urge speedy retaliation if it were found that travel to “free” zones *through* “forbidden” zones was not permitted. However, two United States Embassy members have now been permitted to visit Tiflis and Stalingrad so it appears that travel through forbidden zones is permitted. Of course, this relative freedom may be taken away at any time in the future.

7. With regard to the size and status of our missions in Eastern Europe, the proposal to reduce the size of our missions was not favoured. If the missions were to continue, they should have the necessary complement of working officers, and appropriate staff; otherwise, their effectiveness would be seriously reduced. Whether the missions were to be called Legations and Embassies, or Consulates-General was perhaps more a question to be decided on domestic considerations and on whether we wished to express our disapproval of Communism by a gesture of that sort. A withdrawal of staff altogether would depend on domestic factors and on long term political considerations with respect to our policy towards Eastern Europe. The missions in Eastern Europe were performing a useful job of reporting on political and economic questions, and importance should be attached to our having listening posts in the one group of states with which we could conceivably be at war in the foreseeable future — a group whose policies had such an important bearing on the whole development and future of Canada.

8. In the conclusion of the memorandum, it is pointed out that a “tough” policy with respect to publicity, travel, and the status or existence of missions ultimately depends on (a) domestic considerations, and (b) a governmental decision concerning Canada’s *long term* foreign policy. Probably the majority of the Canadian public would support a tough and momentarily spectacular policy on the “diplomatic” front. The long term wisdom of such a policy would have to depend on whether we expect to reach an eventual *modus-vivendi* with the Soviet Union, whether we wish to close the door to all contact, official and otherwise, whether we wish to fight a diplomatic cold war as well as a political one, etc. Our missions in Eastern Europe are doing a useful job as “listening posts”. A cautious and gradual policy in the realm of ‘diplomatic’ restrictions, retaining our missions at their present strength and status, would be consistent with the following purposes: It would enable us to retain our “listening posts”; in the event of our engaging eventually, in concert with other Western Powers, in an active campaign in supporting anti-Communist forces in Eastern Europe, our missions there would take on additional importance; and at the same time the door would always be kept open for an improvement of relations in the future.