

than 150,000 or 200,000 men in the great cities and harbours all along the Atlantic coast, and to that extent of compelling an outlay of men and money, and thus crippling the resources of the United States, and occupying armies which might otherwise be used to augment the forces employed against Canada.

The above measures, which would probably absorb from 40,000 to 50,000 effective men, are necessary for the defence of the empire at home, and in her colonies and possessions, before placing a single soldier in Canada as a theatre of war. They are ancillary to operations in Canada, and will act as a diversion in favour of them; but these latter must be conducted independently, from a secure base, upon the true and strict principles established by the experience of war, no departure from which is sanctioned by the experience of the war now raging between the Federal and Confederate States.

The first condition of war is a secure base of operations. The importance of a fortress into which the Government of Canada may, in case of danger, retire, and from which the resources of the colony may be directed, has been well shown in a letter lately published in the 'Times' by General Sir E. Cust. The position which, so far as Canada is concerned, is best calculated to fulfil the necessary conditions of a secure base of operations, is Quebec. Naturally strong, and in a position where for six months in each year it can be in direct communica-