

other treaties with Austria and Germany before having been given an opportunity to voice appropriate representations before the council of foreign ministers appointed by the four great powers. I imagine such an attitude was dictated to our government only by its wish not to accept any other clauses or conditions than those which could be of benefit to our own country, and which are indispensable to the achievement of our ultimate aim, which is the establishment of peace on a firm and solid basis.

Canada has every right to insist upon active participation in the peace settlement with Germany and Austria. That right was clearly expressed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. St. Laurent) when he said in this house on January 30 last in his statement, which can be found at page 7 of *Hansard*:

In the waging of war, however, Canada contributed her resources of men and material without reserve. No question of partial participation arose. It should be possible, therefore, to ensure for Canada an opportunity to contribute to the negotiation of peace on the same basis of honourable partnership that characterized her contribution to the war.

So far as Germany is concerned, it is to be hoped that with this nation, whose illegitimate ambitions and desires for domination have been the constant cause of fear, an equitable solution will be found. In this respect I wish to say that the treaty must not have the effect of giving Germany another opportunity to wage war, but at the same time it must not produce the result of driving that nation to such a state of misery that injustice will be created, the consequence of which will be even greater.

So far as Austria is concerned, I entirely approve the statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the name of the Canadian government. The statement, as reported in *Hansard*, at page 761, supports the recognition of Austria as a free and independent state. I also approve the statement concerning the maintenance of the democratic system in the new nation in order to avoid a new *anschluss*. The duty lies, then, with the security council of the united nations organization to see to it that care is exercised to protect the rights of these Austrian people to enjoy freedom and also to have a government of their own choice. But to avoid the danger of an injustice in that respect would it not have been good policy to invite the nations which were defeated to participate also with us and to become themselves immediately

[Mr. Pinard.]

members of the united nations organization which has assumed the task of preparing this new order in the world?

At the end of world war 1 such was the attitude taken by the victorious nations and it was by no means the reason which brought about the failure of the league of nations. The reasons for such failure were totally different and had nothing to do with such a policy and I shall have a few words to say about that.

I find, Mr. Speaker, in this refusal of the united nations to invite the defeated nations to become active members and parties to its deliberations one of the first deficiencies in the present world effort toward the establishment of peace. It is my contention that these nations had also the right, through newly organized and democratic governments, to make their representations; and it appears to me to be an undeserved punishment inflicted upon these people to impose upon them conditions of peace which they do not have an opportunity to discuss. Of course the injustice would not appear to be too serious if such procedure were only an attack upon their legitimate pride; but if, on the other hand, the treaties were unjust and vexatious, it will be the world at large which will suffer in the future the consequences of such an attitude.

I wish now to discuss and deal with a mistake which is far greater in consequences and which has been the constant subject of protests by a great number of nations. I wish to refer to this veto privilege attributed to the five great powers in the security council of the united nations organization by article 27 of the charter. At the beginning of negotiations and before the adoption of the charter, every nation was given to understand that such a decisive right was one of the most essential of conditions and that it was, in fact, the condition *sine qua non* of the formation of the organization itself. These greater powers, justly conscious of their tremendous effort during the war, and also, of course, of their importance in the world scene, decided then to insist upon that right of veto before agreeing to become members of the organization. If such a right had not been granted to them, it appears to be true that the charter would never have been signed; and it also appears to be true that the united nations organization might never have been born. But, the importance of this question of veto cannot be minimized at the present time. To illustrate that fact, I wish to quote from certain remarks made on October 28, 1946, at