

on atomic energy control meant. But the Soviet representative walked out of the meeting without clarifying his own position in any respect. When these talks are resumed, as I hope they will be, maybe we shall be able to get that clarification, which must be insisted on because it is vital to the whole question.

To be specific and definite on this point, sir, I should like to draw the attention of the house to a comparison of what Mr. Vishinsky said in his main speech on this subject to the general assembly last November and what was proposed by the Soviet representative at the twelfth meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 11, 1947.

In summing up Soviet views on inspection--and this is the crux of the problem--Mr. Vishinsky made six points last November, which were simply a condensed rewording of the original Soviet proposals. On the heart of the matter, Mr. Vishinsky said that there should be --and I am quoting from his statement--"periodic and special investigation of the activities of enterprises extracting atomic raw materials"; that is, periodic and special investigation by some international atomic authority. That sounded fine. The Soviet proposals a couple of years previously said, and I quote from them:

The international control commission shall periodically carry out inspection of facilities for the mining of atomic raw materials and for the production of atomic materials and atomic energy. . . and carry out special investigations in cases where suspicion of violations . . . arises.

All that Mr. Vishinsky added to that statement was that he wished--

--to make it quite clear that periodic inspection means inspection at intervals, but intervals as determined by necessity and by decision of the international control commission whenever that commission deems it fitting that such inspections should take place.

That is all very well as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to give us that security under international control which is essential if we are to sign any international agreement. For instance, it does not allow for international inspectors to be on the job all the time, which we think is essential; nor does it explain how the international control commission could determine whether any country had declared all of its production facilities.

The Soviet union has added nothing to the most inadequate section of its proposals; for Mr. Vishinsky did not explain how "special investigation" could work in a country which would not allow inspectors to go anywhere except to the atomic establishments which it chose to declare. There is still nothing in the Soviet proposals to prevent a country hiding away, in a remote corner of its territories, a whole series of atomic installations which it would not necessarily declare, and which the inspectors would therefore never know anything about because they could go only where they were shown, and then only at intervals.

We must be careful when we examine proposals of the kind which I have indicated; and we must be especially careful to see that the interpretation given to those proposals in our own country is not false and misleading, if we can prevent it. I am not, however, so much concerned at the moment with trying to indicate where the blame for failure lies as in finding a possible