

weapons capability, has been lauded as possessing the "Islamic Bomb." Viewed as Pakistan's answer to India's "Hindu Bomb", this is a growing problem of perception that threatens to introduce additional elements of emotion and rhetoric to the regional nuclear debate, further weakening the chances for non-proliferation and roll-back.

INDIA-PAKISTAN VS. ARGENTINA-BRAZIL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

There are many reasons to emphasize the differences between the two contexts discussed in this paper, that between Argentina and Brazil, and that between India and Pakistan. However, it should also be said that there are major similarities between the two cases as well. Elements of our early typology will be seen in different lights here.

First, there is the issue of international and domestic prestige. We have seen the importance of prestige considerations in the two bilateral rivalries and especially in the nuclear dimension of those rivalries. Brazil's drive for status and *grandeza* has been a constant in its interest in nuclear energy as well as related interest in missile technology. And Argentina has replied to this interest with a desire to be seen to be still in the game where the two countries' historic dispute is concerned. There has also clearly been a continuing importance to the idea of technological prowess and the demonstration thereof for both countries.

These elements apply even more in the India-Pakistan context. Nuclear power has consistently been seen by India, if not so much by Pakistan, as a major factor in national prestige. Showing off the nation's scientific capabilities has been a source of national pride and cohesion for a society with infinite internal problems. And nowhere has this been more visible than in the area of nuclear energy. And if Pakistan was slow to see the utility of this demonstration of potential power and development, it has now definitely understood the lesson. Before the international community, the region, and the Muslim world, the prestige value of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons potential is now clear to Islamabad.

Domestic prestige for leaders or political movements is also of weight here. As we have seen, this factor intervened repeatedly for Indian and later Pakistani leaders although less dramatically for Brazilian and Argentine. The military leaders of these South American countries headed regimes that were far from personalist although they often had individual agendas and personal support bases. Nationalist *prises de position* could often improve their own and their governments' reputations with the press and public opinion. And if the role of the nuclear question was never as key personally for Argentine or Brazilian generals as it was for Indira Gandhi or General Zia, it could affect domestic politics.

Then, there is the issue of domestic politics. Indeed, the role of the question in domestic politics, while different in the four countries, is present in all. In Argentina it became an issue in civil-military relations with the armed forces largely supporting a weapons programme and most of civil society, other than nationalist sectors, opposed. In Brazil this same situation was reflected but