

Hurlburt: 4).

With respect to Montenegro, Serbia's junior partner in the FRY, the growing secessionist movement in the late 1990s posed a dilemma for the international community. On the one hand, it was a useful diversion for, and source of pressure against, the Milosevic regime. On the other, the west (especially the EU) had set its face against the further dismantling of Balkan states, given the continuing fragility of territorial arrangements in Bosnia under Dayton, and the crises in Kosovo and Macedonia. Sensitive also to the need for a stable post-Milosevic FRY at the heart of its regional strategy, the EU assumed the role of mediator between Belgrade and Podgorica, managing with some difficulty to broker an agreement which changed the constitutional relationship between the two republics while leaving the door open for a possible referendum on Montenegrin secession in the near future.

Another direct consequence of NATO's action in Kosovo was the destabilization of the delicate ethnic balance in the FYROM, first by the influx of massive numbers of Kosovar Albanians and later through the radicalizing influence of the KLA on the Albanian minority in the west of the country. Alongside the US, the EU's response was to mediate between the two Macedonian communities in attempt to find a constitutional adjustment that would satisfy at least the moderates on both sides. Clearly convinced that this was just the sort of problem for which the CFSP was designed, the EU was noticeably assertive in pursuing the lead role through its twin foreign-policy heads – External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana. All the same, the Americans tend to claim at least equal credit for the agreement signed between Macedonia's Slavs and Albanians at Ohrid in August 2001 (Abramovitz and Hurlburt: 6). As the need for a follow-on operation to replace NATO's Amber Fox security force for the peace-monitors in the FYROM became apparent, the EU offered its services in the form of a force under the new ESDP. For over a year its implementation was held hostage to the continuing dispute between Greece and Turkey over the EU's prospective use of NATO resources for its new rapid-reaction force, but is now set for the spring of 2003.

In working to seize the opportunities and manage the risks arising in the wake of the Kosovo operation, the EU not only resorted to its traditional tools of trade and aid, but sought an active and prominent place for itself in the international community's efforts to mediate the ensuing domestic conflicts on neighbouring countries. Its motives here appear mixed. In part they had to do with thwarting irredentist and secessionist movements in the region, drawing on a general presumption among EU members against ethnically-driven solutions and a specific concern about spillover into Bosnia. In part, too, they flow from a reflex to demonstrate that the CFSP can go beyond mere rhetoric to solve substantive if modest-scaled problems – the same reflex that had first drawn Brussels into the Yugoslav crisis in 1991.

Independently of events in Kosovo, political change also came to Croatia beginning with the death of President Franjo Tudjman in late 1999, followed by the defeat of his HDZ party and the election of a moderate president eager to take the country into NATO and the EU. The new leadership has been able to face down residual nationalist opposition in breaking Zagreb's ties with