

was ratified, the United States and Russia would proceed to deactivate all strategic delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status. They also agreed to an intensified expert dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces. They noted new opportunities to strengthen stability through openness and transparency, and agreed that each side would independently consider further unilateral steps, as appropriate, with regard to their respective nuclear forces, including reduction in, and enhancements to, the security of non-strategic nuclear forces. They also agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. The two sides agreed to a joint exercise of theatre missile defences and early warning of missile launches, to exchange detailed information at Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meetings on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security. Taking a broad view of strategic stability, the two sides reiterated their commitment to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.

The sixth Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, March 21, 1997 in Helsinki, underscored the progress achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security, including: significant reductions in nuclear forces, detargeting of strategic missiles, reaffirmation of their commitment to further reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. Importantly, understandings were reached on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms, demarcation between ABM and theatre missile defence systems, immediate negotiation on START II once START II had entered into force - which would establish, by December 31, 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each party; transparency in strategic nuclear warhead inventories; the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads; placement in a deactivated status of all SNDVs which would be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps (with assistance through the Nunn-Lugar programme) to facilitate early deactivation; the deadline for the elimination of SNDVs under START II would be extended to December 31, 2007. Once again, the two sides confirmed their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty - a cornerstone of strategic stability. Agreement was also reached on limiting tests for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems, with the velocity of the ballistic target missiles to not exceed 5 km/sec, and the flight range of the ballistic target missiles to not exceed 3500 km. Neither side would develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The seventh summit took place, September 2, 1998 in Moscow, with agreement on a joint statement on the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning, with the objective of the continuous exchange of information on the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles derived from each side's missile launch warning system, including the possible establishment of a center for the exchange of missile launch data operated by the two sides but separately from their respective national centres; and to examine the possibility of establishing a multilateral ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other states could voluntarily participate.

At the G-8 summit in Cologne, June 20, 1999, agreement was reached on a joint statement concerning strategic offensive and defensive arms and further strengthening of stability. The two sides concurred that strategic stability could be strengthened only if there was compliance with existing arms reduction agreements.