

instance, Canada was thrust into those wars.

During World War I, English Canada's loyalty and allegiance to Great Britain coupled with its sentimental attachment to that country resulted in a major war effort on the part of the Canadian state. However, sentimentality, loyalty and allegiance were only part of the reason for the Canadian state to become so heavily involved in this war. There were other reasons as well. One of those reasons appears to be based on the need of the Canadian government of the day to demonstrate to the rest of the world that Canada had come into its own; that it was indeed an independent and sovereign state able to make foreign and defence policy decisions and willing to send military troops into those areas around the world from whence threats to the Canadian state originated. Indeed, Canada sent some 500,000 troops to Europe to fight alongside the British and sustained roughly 60,000 deaths. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky put it: this "was a contribution, and a price, out of all proportion to the country's size."⁸

This was the price that the Canadian government at the time was willing to pay in order for Canada to develop an international legal personality.⁹ It also sent out a signal to the rest of the world that Canada was capable of making "rational" calculations about its security interests.¹⁰ The calculation in this case was simply based on the premise that an upstart Germany would pose a serious threat not only to British interests but also to Canadian ones. If Germany was able to win the war, it would disrupt the balance of power in Europe, dominate the European continent, challenge the hegemonic leadership of Great Britain -- particularly its supremacy over the seas -- and eventually pose a direct threat to North America and therefore to Canada. It was from that point on that the Canadian government made the calculation that Europe would be part of its "strategic perimeter".¹¹

The heavy toll which the Canadian armed forces took at Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele, in its first major war effort, resulted in the country gaining some influence in international councils such as the Imperial War Cabinet, the Versailles Peace Conference and, later, the League of Nations. But those heavy losses, along with the backlash stemming from the conscription issue in 1917, which divided French and English Canada, caused the Canadian government to reflect on the nature of its alliance with Britain. While taking a relatively active role in the League, by 1922 Canada began to withhold support for British Imperial actions. For example, when Britain asked Canada to contribute forces in its interventionary action in Turkey, the Canadian government refused. Withdrawing into semi-isolation allowed Canada to reduce the level of its armed forces. Instead of embracing fully the most important principle of political realism, i.e. the essential nature of *self help* ("the ultimate dependence of the state on its own resources to promote its interests and protect itself"),¹² the Canadian state instead opted during the interwar years not to build up any significant armed forces and, instead, to put its faith in disarmament and peacemaking efforts, primarily through the use of multilateral instruments. Canada's commitment to the multilateralism can, in fact, be traced to its involvement in the the League of Nations, and League membership was "actively sought as an avenue for furthering Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs."¹³

However, with the failure of the League of Nations and the breakdown of the multipolar balance of power system in Europe in the mid to late 1930s, it became clear to the Canadian government that unless multilateral instruments were strengthened significantly, Canada would have to depend on strong alliances and/or the protection of the US to ensure its security. By the late 1930s it became evident that without the support of the US (and without its active