

the United Nations is hard-pressed to find funds for a new operation. There is the question whether the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary-General should have the main political control. There are issues of human rights at stake, questions of treaty interpretation and implementation, a problem of nation building from elements of diverse ethnic origin and religious belief. There may be a pressing demand for economic and social assistance if Cyprus is to have viable statehood.

These are some of the main elements of the dilemma. They go a long way to explain the delays in putting United Nations machinery to work in Cyprus. Some of them are worth examining more closely in order to illustrate the basic problems of the United Nations at the present time.

POLITICAL FACTORS

On the political front, it seems clear that the powers concerned cannot reach sufficient agreement among themselves to bring about a solution without United Nations assistance. The fact that earlier efforts outside the United Nations led inevitably to Security Council consideration of the problem demonstrated this point. The wisdom of the move was reflected in the fact that the Council adopted a resolution giving the United Nations, and specifically the Secretary-General, authority to act.

Canada believes that the Security Council should exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining peace and that the General Assembly should not try to usurp that responsibility unless the Council has failed to act. The UN can no more afford to be dominated by regional majorities than by the great powers or any combination of them. This position has been held by Canada ever since San Francisco, and we have consistently sought to have it accepted generally in the United Nations.

Canada believes, too, that the United Nations should be able to respond effectively in Cyprus as it has in other situations broadly similar in nature. In Lebanon, in 1958, it succeeded in quelling an incipient civil war and in helping to bring about national reconciliation. In the Congo, in 1960, it assumed a heavy responsibility which it could not shirk for fear that deterioration there would lead to wider conflict. The assistance rendered in Yemen during the past year was similarly motivated.

Cyprus attained independence as a consequence of an international agreement reached outside the United Nations but under the impetus of resolutions adopted in the General Assembly. That earlier action of mobilizing opinion in favour of an agreed solution forms a background for current United Nations efforts to preserve the peace in Cyprus.

This United Nations responsibility for the security and welfare of small states is a cardinal reason for keeping the United Nations in effective being - both as a peace keeper and as a catalyst for economic, social and humanitarian causes.

FINANCING

It is not sufficient to pay lip service to this aim. The United Nations can have no real meaning in international affairs unless the many words spoken

within its halls and on other public platforms are translated into deeds. At the present time, the most pressing practical requirement is to ensure that the organization has adequate funds for its many activities. Nowhere is the need more urgent than in the field of peace keeping.

For many years, Canada has been striving to promote sound administrative and budgetary methods in the United Nations, including the Specialized Agencies. We were instrumental in recent years in bringing about the establishment of the Working Group of Twenty-one on United Nations Finances in the field of peace keeping. The Canadian position has consistently been based on a conviction that financial contribution to support United Nations action must be shared by all members, great and small. Just as peace is indivisible, so is the financial responsibility for peace keeping. Political decisions designed to preserve security and stability must be backed by sound proposals for sharing the costs.

This is a position of principle which Canada has reiterated year after year. But we have not been so rigid in our belief in that principle as to blind us to practical needs in urgent circumstances. This is why we have supported *ad hoc* arrangements for financing operations in the Middle East, in the Congo, in West New Guinea. Throughout, however, we have continued to insist that these *ad hoc* arrangements - never entirely satisfactory - must not prejudice long-term financing arrangements which can form the basis for solid planning for peace, both by the Secretariat and by contributing governments. This is the basis of our approach to the financing of a Cyprus operation. We are acutely conscious that steps taken in the emergency situation now prevalent in that island may affect the attitude of member states toward the financing of peace keeping generally. They could influence the future deliberations of the Working Group of Twenty-one. They may even be seized upon by some as a further means of avoiding the Charter responsibility for sharing expenses of the organization - a responsibility which has been reinforced by the 1962 advisory opinion of the International Court.

It is particularly important to keep these financial considerations in mind because this year Article 19, concerning the loss of vote in the Assembly, could become operative in relation to important members of the organization.

UNITED NATIONS PREPAREDNESS

Once again, the urgent requirements in Cyprus have illustrated the need to prepare in advance for prompt United Nations engagement in peace-keeping operations. This is a matter of contingent planning in United Nations headquarters by military and political staffs, of earmarking, training, and equipping units and personnel in national defence establishments, of improving methods for processing United Nations requests for assistance, of standardizing operational procedures.

Canadian views in this regard have been stated so often that it is hardly necessary for me to do more than mention them. We have been pressing for the establishment of a military planning staff which could assist the Secretary-General and his political advisers

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