

UNSCR 707(1991), passed on 15 August 1991, applied greater precision to the process. It required Iraq to reveal all relevant details pertaining to its non-conventional weapons programs and to ensure that UN inspectors were provided with unrestricted and unconditional access to any area, facility, equipment and records which they wished to examine.

UNSCR 715, adopted by the Council on 11 October 1991, approved the long-term monitoring and verification plans submitted to it by UNSCOM and the IAEA in compliance with direction outlined in UNSCR 687(1991). It directed Iraq to accept and facilitate the implementation of the plans through methods which included on-site inspections, aerial overflights and the provision of full, final and complete declaration on the part of Iraq. These monitoring and verification plans focussed on both the civilian and military sectors of the Iraqi industrial complex. They incorporated the use of periodic inspections and environmental sampling as means for deterring any clandestine production of non-conventional weapons.

These three resolutions form an indivisible package from which the final future compliance verification regime will be fashioned. From the perspective of the United Nations, efforts to plan for implementation with Iraqi authorities, without the latter's explicit and unconditional recognition of all three resolutions, proved impossible. It was Iraq's refusal to recognize this inter-applicability, particularly in terms of UNSCR 715(1991), which created a number of confrontations and delayed implementation of a future compliance mechanism by more than two years.

Inspection Experience

During the period between 15 May 1991 and 31 December 1993, UNSCOM and the IAEA completed 65 on-site inspections (OSI) in Iraq (see Annex "B"). Approximately one-third of these inspections were related to the nuclear weapons program area, another third to the ballistic missiles field and the remainder to matters associated with Iraq's inventory of chemical weapons as well as to Iraq's biological weapons research program. UNSCOM has implemented at least four different types of on-site inspections designed to meet special requirements. A number of inspections were of a specialist nature. For example, one inspection focused on a computer centre in connection with computers suspected to have been used for prohibited activities. Another, the last inspection of 1993, was designed to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use in the southern marshland near Basrah. The inspections generally have been energetic, rigorous and intrusive, mainly because of Iraq's failure to adopt a candid and open approach to the full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapon programs as called for in the Security Council resolutions.